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ABSTRACT

Jurisdictional mismatch plagues contemporary environmeiTtal
1aw and policy. The division of authority and responsibility for
environmental protection between the federal and state
govemments lacks any cohesive rationale or justification. The
federal govemment regulates in many areas where there is nc clear
anaiytical basis for federal involvement. At the saroe time, the
federal govemment is relatively absent where a strongeT federal
presence could be justified. Conversely, states ere precluded,
discouraged, or otherwise inhibited from adopting environment:::d
protections where state efforts would be worthwhile. ln addition,
state intervention seeps into are8.S where 21. dominant feder.'l.l ro1P
vvould be more defensible, This jurisdictional mismatch produces
sub-optimal levels of environmental protection, V\lastes regulatory
resources, discourages innovation,, and iHhibits the c.doj:;tio,·, ax,C:
evolution of more effective environmental protection measures.
Environmental protections would be more successfl.tl v/ere
responsibility divided between the federal and state governrnents
in a more justifiable manner. To address the cw.'!·ent n-:>ismatr;h, the
federal govemment should reorient its efforts toward those areas in
which the federal govemment possesses an institutional advantage,,
due to economies of scaie or where state and local govemments
are incapable of addressing environmental problems,. such a~
where there are substantial interstate spillovers.

Jonathan H.. Adler is Associate Professor of Law and Associate Director of
the Center for Business Law and Regulation, Case Vvestern Reserve University
School of Law. This paper is based upon a presentation at the Nell' York
Uniw'rsity Em·ironmentol La11' Journal SymposimTl on "State Roles in U.S.
Environmental Law and Policy," March 25, 2005. The rmthor would like to
thank J. Bishop Grewell, Andrew Morriss, and Joei Schwariz for their comments
and critiques, as well as tv'iatthew Dunne and Nathaniel Stewart for their valuable
research assistance.
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INTRODUCTION

Contemporary federal enviromnental regulations are often
faulted for tl;eir excessive rigidity and centraiizatiuii.I 1~s;. equd, if
less commonly analyzed, problem with current environmental
protection effm1s is the mismatch between the nahlre and scope of
environmental problems and the nah1re and scope of those
instiiutions charged with solving them. That is, setting aside the
choice of specific policy instruments, the cun-ent division of
authority and responsibility for environmental protection betvveen
the federal and state govemments lacks a coherent rationale. 1\lo
1

This critique is Slmm1mized in Jonathan H. Adler, Letting F(fiy Flml'els
Bloom: Using Federalism to Spur Environmental Innovation, in THE
JURJSDYNA!V!ICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: CHANGE AND THE PRAG!V!ATIC
VOICE IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 263-64 (Jim Chen ed., 2004); see also Richard
B. Stewart, Controlling Environmental Risks Through Economic Incentives, J 3
COLUivl. J. ENVTL. L. 153, 154 (1988) ("[T]he system has grown to the point
where it amounts to nothing less than a massive effort at Soviet-style central
planning of the economy to achieve enviroru11ental goals."); DANIEL A. FARBER,
EcO-PRAGMATISM: MAKING SENSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS IN AN
UNCERTAIN WORLD 179-83 (1999) (summarizing problems of overly centralized
environmental regulation).

132

N.Y.U. ENVIRONJiiENTA!.., LAFV JOfJRNAL

particular theory of the proper role of varying levels of govem.n!ent
in t:nvironment~il policy ce;n explain the ct.uTent <kvisi,}n. The
result is a jurisdictional mismatch in enviromnental policy that
compromises the effectiveness of measures intended to pratect t11e
environrnent.
The federal govemment regulates in many areas where there
is no clear analytical basis for federal regulation. At the .same
time, the federal govemment is relatively absent INhere a stronger
federal presence could be justified. Conversely, existing federal
statutes and regulations often preclude, discourage, or othenNise
inhibit state and local govemments from adopting en"lirGn:i-iltT,>:.:,1
protections where state effm-ts would be wmthv-vhile. Yet states
are not inactive.
Rather, it appears that state po1icyrn.akers
increasingly seek to satisfy their constituents' demand for
environmental protection by intervening in areas better left in
the hands of the federal govemment. This mismatch between
envir01m1ental problems and regulatory responsibility undermints
environmental protection and compounds the problems of
instrument choice and implementation. It also erodes politiGaJ.
accountability for environmenta.l policy.
A claim of jurisdictional mismatch should be pi:emised
upon some account c.f !he p·roJ=~er state and fed~st. cJ tolts
in environmental protection. Accordingly, Part I outlines why
"ecologies of scale" suggest that many environrnenta! problems
should be left in state or local hands. It further identifies some
of the benefits of decentralized environmental decision-m<:~.king.
}\Jot all environmental concerns are best handled at the state
or local level, however. Pari: H identifies and evaluates those
considerations which might justify a preference for federal
authority over environrnental matters. '~Nhile federalism principles
suggest a general presumption in favor of state responsibility for
various policy concerns, this presumption may be overcome --;;:her~
there is a distinct and readily identifiable federal interest, su.:h <':~
clir im':Eorstate spiHvver or econmnies of s.:::a1e that prv''ide the
federal government -vvith an institutional advantage in addressing
particuJar concems. Absent su.:::h considerations, hO'Neve~·, most
environmental matters are be2t left in state and local hands.
Pmi HI contrasts the proper division of state and federal
responsibilities with cunent practice, revealing a widespread
"institutional misrnatch." While there is a principled case for an
active: federal role in many aspects of environmental policy, the
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federal government is relatively absent from those areas. At the
same time, the federal government is heavily involved in many
areas better left in state and local hands. One potential impact of
such mismatch is greater state involvement in matters properly
addressed at the federal level.
The institutional mismatch within environmental policy
cannot be fixed overnight. This article concludes by suggesting
some modest steps that could be taken to begin reorienting federal
efforts toward those areas in which federal action is most needed
and that match federal environmental authmity with the greatest
t1T'Iiro1m1enta! need.
I. ECOLOGIES OF SCALE

As a general structural matter, it is more efficient and
effective to address environmental problems through institutions of
equivalent scope as the problem in question. 2 As Professor Esty
notes, where the scope of a problem does not match the
responsible institution's jurisdiction, "the cost-benefit calculus will
be skewed and either too little or too much enviromnental
protection will be provided." 3 By matching jurisdiction with the
scope of a given problem, the institutional stmcture can ensure the
greatest "match" between a given problem and the institutional
response. Environmental protection efforts are most likely to be
optimal where those who bear the costs and reap the benefits of a
given policy determine how best, and even whether, to address a
given enviromnental concern. This does not mean that all
environmental problems should be addressed at the same level,
however. Rather, the varying scopes of various environmental
problems suggest the need for a "multitier regulatory stmcture that
2

See HENRY N. BUTLER & JONATHAN R. MACEY, USING FEDERALISM TO
IMPROVE ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 2 (1996) ("[T]he size of a geographic area
affected by a specific pollution source should determine the appropriate
govemmentallevel for responding to the pollution.").
3
Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV.
570, 587 (1996). Such a jurisdictional mismatch can also create a "regulatory
cmmnons." See William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatol}' Commons: A
Themy of Regulatmy Gaps, 89 IOWA L. REv. 27 (2003) ("Regulatory conunons
problems arise where a social ill does not fall squarely within any particular
political-legal regime's turf."). Professor Buzbee suggests that the "'regulatory
commons problem' creates predictable incentives in complex, multi-layered
political-legal contexts for social ills not to be overregulated, but to remain
unaddressed, to remain gaps in regulation." Jd. at 5.
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tracks the complexity and diversity of environmental problems."4
The federalist structure of American government supports
a general, albeit rebuttable, presumption that any given policy
question should be addressed by state governments. 5 This
presumption is embodied in the stmcture of the Federal
Constitution, which grants the federal govemment limited and
emunerated powers while reserving all other matters to the states. 6
For the federal government to act, it must demonstrate that a given
policy is within the scope of its enumerated powers. 7 Where the
federal government does not act, matters will remain in state
hands. 8
This basic Constitutional structure suggests a principle of
"subsidiarity" 9-the principle that problems should be addressed at
4

Esty, supra note 3, at 571.
See James L. Huffman, Maldng Environmental Regulation More Adaptive
Through Decentralization: The Case for Subsidiarity, 52 U. KA.N. L. REv. 1377,
1379 (2005) ("[O]ther core values of American government are served by
decentralization."). See also, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, The Race to the Bottom
and Federal Environmental Regulation: A Response to Critics, 82 MINN. L. REv.
535, 536-38 (1997) (arguing for a "rebuttable presumption in favor of
decentralization" in environmental policy).
6
Those powers not expressly delegated are, as the Tenth Amendment makes
explicit, "reserved to the States, respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST.
amend. X. See also THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 292 (James Madison) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961) ("The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the
federal government are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State
governments are numerous and indefinite.").
7
See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803) ("The
powers of the legislature are defmed, and limited; and that those limits may not
be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written.").
8
For further discussion of the application of constitutional- federalism
principles to environmental policy, see Jonathan H. Adler, Judicial Federalism
and the Future of Federal Environmental Regulation, 90 IOWA L. REV. 377
(2005). For a somewhat different perspective on this question, see Robert V.
Percival, "Greening" the Constitution-Harmonizing Environmental and
Constitutional Values, 32 ENVTL. L. 809 (2002).
9
See George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the
European Community and the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 331, 338-39
(1994) (defming "subsidiarity" as the "notion that action should be taken at the
lowest level of government at which particular objectives can adequately be
achieved"); Huffman, supra note 5, at 1381 (subsidiarity is "the idea that social
decision-making should take place at the least centralized level appropriate to the
This principle is endorsed in the principles for
decision in question").
sustainability of Agenda 21. U.N. Conference on Environment & Development,
Rio de Janerio, Brazil, June 3-14, 1992, Agenda 21, ~ 8.5(g), U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.151/26 (calling for national governments to delegate environmental
responsibilities "to the lowest level of public authority consistent with effective
5
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- the lowest level at which they can be practically addressed.
Subsidiarity is particularly appropriate in the context of
environmental policy, and leads to the sort of "multitier regulatory
structure" that Professor Esty suggests. 10
Because most
environmental problems are local or regional in nature, 11 there is a
strong case that most (though not all) environmental problems
should be addressed at the state and localleve1. 12 Given the nature
of this nation's federalist system, this approach would entail
allocating responsibility for most environmental problems to state
governments with the hope, if not the expectation, that state
governments would leave ma:p.y concerns to local or regional
authorities. 13
There are additional policy reasons to s~pport a general
presumption in favor of state and local responsibility for
environmental concems. 14 An overly centralized environmental
action").
10
This is not meant to suggest that Professor Esty would endorse all of this
author's analysis. To the contrary, while Professor Esty endorses a similar
framework, he endorses a greater level of federal enviroiUnental regulation than
does this author. Compare Esty, supra note 3, at 571, and Adler, supra note 1.
11
See, e.g., BUTLER & MACEY, supra note 2, at 27 ("The environmental harm
caused by the emission of the same amount of pollution can vary widely,
depending on local environmental conditions.").
12
See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Collaborative Ecosystem Governance: Scale,
Complexity, and Dynamism, 21 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 189, 206 (2002) ("[T]here is
growing recognition that ecologically sound management must be local and/or
regional in character, tailored to the ecosystem context."); Wallace E. Oates, A
Reconsideration of Environmental Federalism, in RECENT ADVANCES IN
ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS 22 (John A. List & Aart de Zeeuw eds., 2002)
(''[W]here environmental quality is basically a local public good, the case for the
setting of environmental standards at an appropriately decentralized level of
government is quite compelling.").
13
See, e.g., DAVID SCHOENBROD, SAVING OUR ENVIRONMENT FROM
WASHINGTON 223 (2005) ("State governments should similarly leave the making
of most pollution-control laws to local governments unless the latter lack
institutional competence."). It is fair to note that environmental problems rarely
respect jurisdiCtional boundaries, an:d existing political subdivisions do not track
ecological boundaries. See Karkkainen, supra note 12, at 212 ("Conventional
territorially delimited lines of authority are, almost without exception, drawn in
near total disregard of ecological boundaries .... "). Moreover, the relevant
ecological boundaries will vary given the particular ecological concern.
Airsheds, watersheds, and terrestrial ecosystem will rarely be mutually
overlapping. As a legal and political matter, however, we are in some sense
"stuck" with existing political subdivisions although states and local
governments may, in some cases, be capable to create intermediary institutions
with jurisdictional authority that traces given environmental concerns.
14
See Huffinan, supra note 5, at 1381 (Although "the principle of
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regulatory system is itself an "affront to nature." 15 Ecological
systems vary tremendously from one place to the next. The failure
to take into account local environmental conditions-let alone
local tastes, preferences, and economic conditions-leads to "one
size fits all" policies that fit few areas well, if at all. 16 For
example, an apple orchard in Washington State has different
requirements than · an orchard in upstate New York because
effective pest control strategies will vary depending with
differences in climate, topography and local conditions. 17 Federal
mandates that municipalities treat stormwater like industrial
pollution discharges or require double liners for landfills may
make sense in the northeast, but such requirements are "ill-suited
to arid regions" with little rainfall or clay-based soils. 18 Requiring
secondary wastewater treatment makes sense in many cities, but
adds little value in coastal communities. 19 Even where states and
localities have flexibility in selecting the means of meeting a given
subsidiarity ... does not insist that centralization is never appropriate," it also
"reflects a presumption in favor of decentralization."); Revesz, supra note 5, at
536-38 (providing reasons for a "rebuttable presumption in favor of
decentralization" in environmental policy).
15
SCHOENBROD, supra note 13, at 228; see also PIETRO S. NIVOLA & JoN A.
SHIELDS, MANAGING GREEN MANDATES: LOCAL RIGORS OF U.S.
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 36 (2001) (noting that ecosystem-based
regulation may require greater reliance upon local judgments); Karldminen,
supra note 12, at 194 (2002) ("[T]he environmental consequences of our actions
may also vary widely, depending upon the particular ecosystem context in which
the action occurs.").
16
See Karol Ceplo & Bruce Yandle, Western States and Environmental
Federalism: An Examination of Institutional Viability, in ENVIRONMENTAL
FEDERALISM 225,225-26 (Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill eds., 1997J ("There
is recognition that homogenous solutions applied to heterogeneous problems
often yield high costs and weak results."). While, as a theoretical matter, federal
regulation could take into account regional variation, "federal regulation
generally imposes uniform requirements throughout the country" and, where
variable standards exist, it is not due to regional environmental differences.
Revesz, supra note 5, at 537.
17
See SCHOENBROD, supra note 13, at 209-10; see also Andrew P. Morriss,

Pesticides and Environmental Federalism: An Empirical and Qualitative
Analysis of§ 24(c) Registrations, in ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM, supra note
16, at 133, 167 ("The information problems for a national regulator attempting to
license every use of every pesticide are so overwhelming that the national
government can never hope to meaningfully solve them.").
18
NIVOLA & SHIELDS, supra note 15, at 3-4.
19
See id. at 4 (citing COMM. ON WASTEWATER MGMT. FOR COASTAL URBAN
AREAS, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, MANAGING WASTEWATER IN COASTAL
URBAN AREAS (1993), available at http://www.nap.edu/books/0309048265/
htrnl/index.htrnl).
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federal environmental goal, the impositiOn of uniform
environmental standards may still "conflict with practicalities on
the ground in particular jurisdictions."20
In addition to allowing for a closer fit between local
ecological conditions and environmental policies, a suitably
decentralized regulatory system provides several other
advantages? 1 First, the ecological and economic diversity of the
nation requires local lmowledge and expertise that is often
unavailable at the federalleve1. 22 A more decentralized system is
better able to overcome this "knowledge problem," 23 and ensure
that regulatory measures take account of local conditions. 24
Second, decentralization, and the resulting policy experimentation
and interjurisdictional competition, can encotrrage policy
innovation as policymakers seek to meet the economic,
environmental, and other demands of their constifuents. 25 As a
result of such competition, states are able to learn from each
others' successes and failures. 26 This competition allows states to
act as environmental "laboratories" developing new and improved
ways of addressing environmental concerns?7
20

NIVOLA & SHIELDS, supra note 15, at 34.
These advantages are discussed in greater detail in Adler, supra note 1, at
265-70. See also PAUL TESKE, REGULATION IN THE STATES 23 (2004).
22
See BUTLER & MACEY, supra note 2, at 27 ("Federal regulators never have
been and never will be able to acquire and assimilate the enormous amount of
information necessary to make optimal regulatory judgments that reflect the
technical requirements of particular locations and pollution sources."); John
Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L. REv.
1183, 1218 (1995) (noting that "[t]he lmowledge necessary to administer any air
pollution control program ... can be found only at the local level").
23
See generally F. A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM.
EcoN. REv. 519, 519-20 (1945) (detailing the economic problem resulting from
"the fact that the lmowledge of the circumstances of which we must make use
never exists in concentrated or integrated form but solely as the dispersed bits of
incomplete and frequently contradictory lmowledge which all the separate
individuals possess").
24
See FARBER, supra note 1, at 180 ("By decentralizing environmental
decision-making, we may be able to obtain improved responsiveness to changing
circumstances and new information.").
25
See generally Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures,
64 J. PoL. EcoN. 416 (1956) (describing the dynamic between the "consumervoter" and their representative local government).
26
See FARBER, supra note 1, at 182-83; see also TESKE, supra note 21, at
240 (noting that "[e]ven when [state experiments] fail, they provide important
information for other states and for national policy").
27
See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis,
21
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In a decentralized system there is more likely to be a "fit"
between a given jurisdiction's policies and the preferences of local
residents.Z 8 Environmental matters often implicate subjective
value preferences which may be quite variable across the nation.
As a result, there is not always a single "right" answer to a given
environmental question, such as whether the national ambient
air quality standard for ozone should be 0.08 or 0.075 parts
per million.
Each potential standard imposes a different
trade-off between competing values and interests. Relatedly,
decentralization can enhance accountability; as Marci Hamilton
observes, "[t]he smaller the polity in geography and in population,
the easier it is for the people (1) to monitor what their government
is doing, (2) to criticize or praise, and therefore (3) to affect public
policy."29 Decentralized systems are also less prone to rentseeking.30
In sum, there is a strong case for a general presumption in
favor of decentralization-a presumption that can be overcome in
any specific policy context by demonstrating the need for federal
intervention. Where such a justification for federal action is
lacking, however, localized control of environmental policy will
produce enviromnental measures that are more likely to reflect the
preferences and needs of those who will be most affected by them.
J., dissenting) ("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel
social and econom.ic experiments without risk to the rest of the country."). See
also David A. Dana, State Browrifields Programs as Laboratories of
Democracy?, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 86,97-104 (2005).
28
See Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the- Founders'
Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1493-94 (1987) ("The first, and most
axiomatic, advantage of decentralized government is that local laws can be
adapted to local conditions and local tastes, while a national govemment must
take a uniforrn.,---and hence less desirable-approach.").
29
Marci Hamilton, Federalism and the Public Good: The True Story Behind
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 78 IND. L.J. 311, 321
(2003); see also Huffinan, supra note 5, at 1393 ("As a simple matter of
arithmetic, an individual vote carries more weight in a small democratic polity
than in a large one."); BUTLER & MACEY, supra note 2, at 7 ("Allocation to local
governments of regulatory authority over local extemalities allows decisions to
be made by the representatives of the decisions who benefit the most and pay the
most for higher environmental quality.").
30
See Barry R. Weingast, The Economic Role of Political Institutions:
Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development, 11 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 1, 6 (1995). Of course, this is not to deny the existence ofrent-seeking, as
well as political corruption in state and local government. Such phenomena
exist, to one degree or another, in all levels of government.
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A default rule in favor of decentralization takes advantage of the
"ecologies of scale" in environmental policy.
Yet such a
preference is only a default rule, and there are several potential
justifications for federal intervention, to which this article now
turns.
II. BASES FOR FEDERAL INTERVENTION
A preference for subsidiarity does not mean there should be
no federal environmental regulation.
At most it creates a
rebuttable presumption toward decentralization-a presumption
that can be overcome with a demonstration that more centralized
action is necessary or likely to produce a more optimal result. 31
Specifically, it suggests that there should be an identifiable federal
interest, or some reason to believe that state and local governments
will be systematically incapable or unwilling to adopt publicly
desired environmental measures, before the federal government
gets involved. Although such a division of authority is not
mandated by the Constitution, it is ge~erally consistent with the
federalist principles embodied in the nation's founding
document. 32
Following are some of the bases upon which one could argue
for federal intervention in environmental matters.
Each is
analytically distinct and, as detailed below, some bases are far
stronger than others. For instance, while the argument for federal
action to address interstate spillovers is unimpeachable, claims that
federal regulation is necessary to prevent a "race to the bottom"
are questionable on both theoretical and empirical grounds. While
there is some overlap in the categories below, they are nonetheless
helpful in evaluating the relative strength of arguments for federal
involvement in various environmental concerns. Further, they can
be used to help identify what sort of federal intervention is most
likely to produce, or at least approach, the optimal environmental
result. The sort of federal intervention best suited to controlling
31

See Revesz, supra note 5, at 536-38.
As noted earlier, this principle underlies the basic federalist structure of the
Constitution, under which the federal . government is delegated limited,
enumerated powers, whereas the states retain all powers not delegated to the
federal government or barred by other constitutional provisions. See supra note
6 and accompanying text. For example, state governments retain a plenary
police power to prevent nuisances and protect the health, welfare and morals of
their citizenry, whereas the federal government has no such power.
32
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interstate spillovers, for example, may not be the sort of federal
intervention most likely to prevent a welfare-reducing "race-tothe-bottom," and vice-versa.
A.

Interstate Spillovers

The strongest case for federal involvement comes in the
context of interstate spillovers, such as when pollution crosses
state lines and the affected states are unable to resolve the conflict
on their own. 33 Where activity in State A causes pollution in State
B, there is an almost unimpeachable case for federal involvement,
even if only to adjudicate the relevant dispute. 34,. While one may
reasonably expect State A to adopt measures to control the
environmental costs of economic activity within State A,
policymakers have little reason to be concerned with the harms
imposed on other jurisdictions. In such a context, State A is
unlikely to adopt sufficient controls because it would bear the
primary costs of any such regulatory measures, whereas the
primary beneficiaries of such controls would be in State B.
Indeed, absent some extemal controls or dispute resolution system,
the presence of interstate spillovers can actually encourage polices
that extemalize environmental harms, such as subsidizing
development near jurisdictional borders so as to ensure that
environmental harms fall disproportionately "downsh·eam. " 35
Policymakers in State B may wish to take action, but they will be
33
This analysis deliberately excludes non-physical externalities, such as
aesthetic or moral harms resulting from disapproval of another region's
environmental policies. If the costs resulting purely from such subjective value
preferences are a suitable basis for federal intervention, there is no limit to the
potential justifications for federal involvement. For this reason, the analysis is
focused on physical or otherwise tangible spillovers, such· as those that would
have been actionable under common law. This not only includes emitting
pollution, but also obstructing or modifying water currents and the like.
34
See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Golden Rules for TransboundmJ' Pollution,
46 DUKE L.J. 931, 932 (1997) ("Given the inherent difficulties in regulation by
any single state, transboundary pollution would seem to present a clear case for
shifting regulatory authority from local to more centralized levels of
governance."). But see David D. Haddock, Sizing Up Sovereigns: Federal
Systems, Their Origin, Their Decline, Their Prospects, in ENVIRONMENTAL
FEDERALISM, supra note 16, at 1, 15 ("[T]o call for national intervention
whenever an externality crosses a state line is to commit the fallacy of the
publicly interested government."). Haddock notes that the costs from some
interstate spillovers may be less than those imposed by "a grasping, inept, or
apathetic regulator." Id.
35
See Revesz, supra note 5, at 541-42.
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unable to control pollution created in State A without the
cooperation of State A. Even where polluting activity imposes
substantial environmental harm within State A, the externalization
of a portion of the harm is likely to result in the adoption of less
stringent environmental controls. 36 Therefore, federal intervention
of some kind is justified.
While interstate spillovers are a real concern, a caveat is in
order. Most transboundary pollution problems remain rather
localized in scope. Ozone-forming emissions in southeastern
Pennsylvania certainly affect air quality in parts ofNew Jersey, but
they do not affect Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Sulfur dioxide
emissions from coal-fired utilities in Ohio may increase pollution
in upstate New York and Vermont, but they do not harm Tacoma,
Washington. Such interstate spillovers may constitute a regional
problem, but this does not inherently justify national regulation. 37
In such cases, regional solutions, such as the creation of regional
entities or congressionally authorized interstate compacts, may be
in order. 38 The same is true in the context of water pollution,
where pollution may permeate a regional watershed without
affecting the nation as a whole. Adopting uniform national
regulations in such contexts can produce the same type of
jurisdictional mismatch that occurs when local problems are
nationalized.
Not all spillovers take the form of State A externalizing the
costs of polluting activities onto State B. In some cases, States A
and B share in a common resource, such as a watershed or airshed.
The Chesapeake Bay watershed, for example, spans from southern
New York down through Virginia and the southern tip of

36

An exception to this problem may be where the harms are reciprocal. In
this case, the two jurisdictions each have an incentive to negotiate environmental
controls.
37
See Haddock, supra note 34, at 15; see also Revesz, supra note 5, at 541
("[T]he [interstate externality] rationale calls only for a response specific to the
problem.").
38
Examples of such entities would include the Ozone Transport
Commission, created under the Clean Air Act of 1970 § 176(a), 42 U.S.C.
§ 7506(a) (2000), to address interstate ozone transport concerns in the eastern
half of the United States, and the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, authorized
under the Tahoe Regional Planning Compact, Pub. L. No. 96-551, 94 Stat. 3233,
3235 (1980). See also, JEROME C. MUYS, NAT'L WATER COMM'N, LEGAL STUDY
No. 14, INTERSTATE WATER COMPACTS: THE INTERSTATE COMPACT AND
FEDERAL-INTERSTATE COMPACT (1971).
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Maryland. 39 In such contexts the spillover effect is reciprocal,
insofar as each state that shares in the common resource has the
ability to externalize the effects of its polluting or resourcedepleting activities on the others, and a "tragedy of the commons"
is likely to result. 40
As with the more direct spillover, however, one cannot
reasonably expect states, acting alone, to adopt welfare-enhancing
environmental protections as the regulating state will bear a
disproportionate share of the costs from such regulation with no
guarantee of reaping proportionate benefits. Some form of federal
intervention, whether it be direct regulation or dispute resolution in
federal court or some other forum, is necessary to ensure the
proper level of environmental protection. Even if the relevant
states are capable of negotiating an interstate compact to protect
the common resource, 41 federal action would be required to
authorize the compact. 42
Similarly, where spillovers are not only interstate, but
intemational, there is a justification for federal involvement.
Indeed, there would be a justification for international intervention
but for the relative absence of effective intemational institutions.

39

See Chesapeake Bay Program, Watersheds, http://www.chesapeakebay.net
/wshed.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2005).
40
See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243
( 1968). While Hardin is usually credited with identifying the "tragedy of the
commons," the tragic dynamic of open-access common pool resources was
identified earlier by fishery economists H: Scott Gordon and Anthony Scott. See
H. Scott Gordon, The Economic The01y of a Common-Property Resource: The
FishelJ', 62 J. PoL. EcoN. 124, 124 (1954); Anthony Scott, The Fishe1y: The
Objectives of Sole Ownership, 63 J. POL. ECON. 116, 116 (1955). Gordon and
Scott themselves were not the first to make this observation. Aristotle made the
same point quite a bit earlier. See ARlSTOTLE, THE POLITICS § 126lb, at 44
(Ernest Barker trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1952) ("[T]hat which is common to the
greatest number has the least care bestowed upon it.").
41
See, e.g., Oates, supra note 12, at 4 (noting theoretical possibility of
"Coasean-type negotiations" to resolve interstate spillover problems); Ilya
Somin, Closing the Pandora's Box of Federalism: The Case for Judicial
Restriction of Federal Subsidies to State Governments, 90 GEO. L.J. 461,475-76
(2002) (suggesting that states can bargain to resolve such spillovers).
42
The "compacts clause" requires congressional approval of interstate
compacts. See U.S. CoN ST. art. I, § I 0, cl. 3 ("No State shall, without the
Consent of Congress ... enter into any Agreement or Compact with another
State.").
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National Public Goods

Not all interstate externalities are the result of pollution
spillovers. There are also externalities created by the existence of
interstate or national "public goods." Insofar as certain ecological
resources located in some states provide non-excludable benefits to
residents in other states, these goods are likely to be
underprovided. Just as private firms in a competitive market may
undersupply goods that produce benefits for which they cannot
charge, individual states may underproduce environmental goods,
such as national parks or species habitat, that provide substantial
uncompensated benefits to residents in other states. For example,
prairie potholes in South Dakota perform various ecological
functions. Some of these functions, such as providing habitat for
migratory waterfowl, may provide substantial benefits to residt:;nts
of other states for which South Dakota is not compensated. As a
result, South Dakota lacks the incentive to provide sufficient
protection for prairie potholes. Similarly, insofar as the existence
of Yellowstone National Park provides benefits to all American
citizens for which Wyoming and Montana are not compensated,
Wyoming and Montana lack sufficient incentive to invest in
conserving the park. 43 Recent empirical research finds some
evidence that states free-ride and underinvest in conservation of
species habitat where the benefits of such action would accrue, at
least in part, to other states. 44
The existence of national public goods may justify federal
action. Yet beyond that which might be necessary to protect a
public good from external harm, 45 the mere existence of such a
public good does not necessarily justify federal regulation. The
traditional means by which governments at any level provide for
public goods is through their power to tax and spend. As a general
matter, governments do not require individual landowners to
donate their land for use as military installations or parks.46
43

Of course, to the extent that out-of-state residents benefit from the
existence of a park by visiting it, and states can charge for access, this problem is
reduced.
44
See John A. List et al., "Beggar Thy Neighbor:" Testing for Free Riding
in State-Level Endangered Species Expenditures, 111 PUB. CHOICE 303, 312-13
(2002).
45
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7470(2) (2000) (provisions to "to preserve, protect,
and enhance the air quality in national parks").
46
Of course, part of the controversy surrounding "regulatory takings" arises
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Rather, the government generates revenue through taxes, bond
issues, or some other mechanism and uses some portion of these
funds to pay for the provision of the public good in question by
acquiring the relevant land parcel, protecting its boundaries,
maintaining it, and so on. 47
It should be noted that just because a given environmental
amenity meets the traditional economic definition of a public good
does not mean that it will not be provided privately, or that
governments at any level can be reliedupon to provide an optimal
amount of the good in question. Even textbook examples of public
goods, such as lighthouses, have been provided privately, 48 as have
many environmental amenities, including species habitat. 49 Ducks
Unlimited, for example, has conserved over eleven million acres of
migratory bird habitat, relying primarily on private donations. 50
The point here is simply that the interstate character of some
environmental public goods can provide a theoretical justification

from the claim that government regulations require individual landowners to
· provide public goods, such as open space or species habitat, at private expense.
See, e.g., Andrew P. Morriss & Richard L. Stroup, Quartering Species: The
"Living Constitution, " the Third Amendment, and the Endangered Species Act,
30 ENVTL. L. 769, 786 (2000); Ike C. Sugg, Caught in the Act: Evaluating the
Endangered Species Act, Its Effects on Man and Prospects for Reform, 24 CuMB.
L. REV. 1, 60-66 (1993); Brian F. Mannix, The Origin of Endangered Species
and the Descent of Man (With Apologies to Mr. Danvin), AM. ENTERPRISE,
Nov.-Dec. 1992, at 56, 59; Robert J. Smith, The Endangered Species Act: Saving
Species or Stopping Growth?, REGULATION, Winter 1992, at 83.
47
See Jonathan H. Adler, The Ducks Stop Here? The Environmental
Challenge to Federalism, 9 SUP. CT. EcoN. REv. 205, 235-36 (2001) (providing
examples of federal funding for interstate environmental public goods, such as
habitat for migratory birds).
48
See Ronald H. Coase, The Lighthouse in Economics, 17 J.L. & EcoN. 357,
363-65 (1974). See also RANDY E. BARNETT, THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY:
JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW 160-67 (1998) (discussing the private provision
of public goods). For examples specific to the environmental context, see Robert
J. Smith, Pn"vate Solutions to Conservation Problems, in THE THEORY OF
MARKET F AlLURE: A CRITICAL EXAMJNATION 341 (Tyler Cowen ed., 1988).
49
See Jonathan H. Adler, Wetlands, Wate1jowl, and the Menace of Mr.
Wilson: Commerce Clause Jurisprudence and the Limits of Federal Wetland
Regulation, 29 ENVTL. L. 1, 59-62 (1999) [hereinafter Adler, Wetlands]
(discussing non-governmental provision of wetlands and species habitat);
Jonathan H. Adler, Back to the Future of Conservation: Changing Perceptions of
Property Rights & Environmental Protection, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY
(forthcoming 2006).
·
50
DUCKS UNLIMITED, DUCKS UNLIMITED ANNuAL REPORT 2004, at 1 (2004),
available at http://www.ducks.org/about/2004Annua1Report/05%20Annual%
20Report-%20Main.pdf.
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for some form of federal intervention.
C.

Economies of Scale

Another argument for federal involvement in environmental
policy is that there are economies of scale in the provision of
certain government function:s. 51 The claim is that it may be more
efficient to perform certain functions at the federal level, for the
country as a whole, rather than separately in each state. Yet there
do not appear to be economies of scale in environmental
regulation. Regulations have to be implemented and enforced at
the state and local level irrespective of whether they are developed
and designed in Washington, D.C. 52 As Professors Butler and
Macey conclude, "whatever the economies of scale associated with
the centralization of environmental policy, they are surely
overwhelmed by the diseconomies of scale in centralized
administration." 53 Nonetheless, there may well be economies of
scale in other aspects of environmental protection. There are two
readily apparent contexts in which economies of scale may justify
federal action. First, economies of scale could justify substantial
federal support of scientific research, data collection, and technical
analyses on environmental issues. Second, economies of scale
may justify federal regulation of products bought and sold in
interstate commerce.
1.

Scientific Research

There are defmite economies of scale in some types of
scientific research that can inform the development of
environmental policy at all levels of government. While much of
the information required for effective environmental protection is
local in nature, much of the relevant scientific knowledge will
have nationwide utility. 54 In this respect, much scientific research
51

Economies of scale are a reduction in the per-unit cost of producing agood
(or providing a service) due an increase in production. See MIT DICTIONARY OF
MODERN ECONOMICS 122 (David Pearce ed., 1992) (defining "economies of
scale" as "[r]eductions in the AVERAGE COST of a product in the LONG RUN,
resulting from an expanded level of output").
52
As Huffman observes, "[e]nforcement is inherently local." Huffman,
supra note 5, at 1378.
53
BUTLER & MACEY, supra note 2, at 27.
54
See CO:MM. ON ASSESSMENT OF WATER REs. RESEARCH, NAT'L RESEARCH
COUNCIL, CONFRONTJNG THE NATION'S WATER PROBLEMS: THE ROLE OF
RESEARCH 68 (2004), available at http://www.nap.edu/books/0309092582/
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generated for environmental protection has aspects of a public
good. 55 For example, the weather conditions and topographical
features that influence ozone formation will vary from place-toplace, but the underlying chemical reactions and effects of ozone
on human respiratory systems and other living organisms will not.
Insofar as the latter is relevant for environmental policy decisions
in all areas affected by ozone pollution, it may be more efficient to
conduct such research at the federal level and make it available to
those jurisdictions where such information can be put to good use.
Were each state required to conduct its own environmental
scientific research, there could be much duplication and
inefficiency. 56 In addition, there are likely to be scale economies
in the resources and technical expertise required for some fonns of
scientific research.
Even where a given problem is particularly local in nah1re,
such as the protection of a mtmicipal drinking water system, there
is still a case for federal research-or at least federally supported
and coordinated research-into the risks posed by various
contaminants, likely sources of contamination, means of
decontamination, and the like. 57 It fmiher makes sense for the
federal govenunent to provide at least some "expertise" on the

htm1/R1.html ("A federal role is appropriate in those research areas where the
benefits of such research are widely dispersed and do not accrue only to those
who fund the research.").
55
See Oates, supra note 12, at 20-21 ("Basic lmowledge concerning the
nah1re and extent of environmental damages from polluting activities and
methods of pollution control are pure public goods on a national (and
international) scale . . . . The basic research function and, in addition, the
dissemination of information on environmental damages and pollution-control
techniques thus has a public-good character that points to a fundamental role for
the central government.").
56
See Esty, supra note 3, at 614-15 ("Absent centralized functions,
iJ1dependent state regulators will either duplicate each other's analytic work or
engage in time-consuming and complex negotiations to establish an efficient
division of technical labor."). Of course it is possible that "competition" could
iJnprove scientific research insofar as different entities pursue different research
methodologies to address emerging environmental problems.
57
See Revesz, supra note 5, at 543 ("The economies-of-scale argument is
most plausible in the early stages of the regulatory process, particularly with
respect to the deterniination of the adverse effects of particular pollutants through
risk assessment."); see also, Terry M. Dinan et a!., Environmental Federalism:
Welfare Losses from Unifonn National Drinking Water Standards, in
ENVIRONMENTAL AND PUBLIC ECONOMICS: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF WALLACE E.
OATES 29 (Arvind Panagariya eta!. eds., 1999).
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technical aspects of regulation, 58 investigating such matters as
regulatory design and implementation. 59 Duplicating this sort of
research at the state level would serve little purpose and divert
resources from other environmental priorities.
Not all research and data collection should be conducted at
the federal level, however. Some research and data collection is
probably best left in state and local hands. In some cases, overcentralization of scientific research may increase the risks of
political manipulation of science. Professor Esty, for one, makes
the case for broad federal involvement in this area, stating that "[i]t
makes no sense to ask every state, city, or town to measure the
level, size, and type of particulates in the air, determine their
connection to respiratory failure and other he.alth problems,
identify the safe level of einissions, and design cost-effective
policy responses." 60
As a general matter, his argument holds tme. However, this
argument may also conflate research in which there are likely to be
scale economies with local data collection, where the case for
federal action will be less strong. Unless one assumes that all
localities should adopt the same environmental measures
irrespective of their local conditions, it may well make sense for
each local jurisdiction to "measure the level, size, and type of
particulates in the air," 61 as such data are necessary to help
determine whether and what kind of pollution control is warranted.
This is not duplicative insofar as different regions have different
ecological conditions. Yet even though there is a case for the local
collection of data about local conditions, Professor Esty is correct
that local research into health effects, safe exposure thresholds,
and potential control strategies could be duplicative. Accordingly,
such research may be conducted more efficiently at the federal
level. Moreover, federal efforts to ensure the consistency and
reliability of state and local data collection efforts would maximize
the national benefits from such local research, further justifying
federal support of local research and data collection.

58

Oates, supra note 12, at 22.
See Esty, supra note 3, at 615 ("[T]he smaller the regulating entity, the
more likely it is to suffer from the absence of scientific scale economies.").
60
ld. at 614.
61 ld.
59
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Product Standards

There may be economies of scale in some types of regulation
that make a single federal standard more efficient than a
multiplicity of state standards. Specifically, a single set of
regulations may make more sense for a single, integrated national
economy. 62 This argument is strongest in the case of product
regulation. 63 Where a given product is bought and sold in national
markets, and will travel throughout interstate commerce, it is less
costly to design and produce the product so as to confonn with a
single national standard. 64 While it is not clear why pulp mill
siting standards in V ennont should match those in Oregon or
Mississippi, if cmmnercial goods are going to be produced on a
national scale for national markets, producers may be best served
if there is a single product standard that applies nationwide. 65
Facility siting and construction will always be subject to local
requirements, but that is not necessarily the case with consumer
products. In addition, consumers may benefit from national
product standards, insofar as lower compliance costs result in
lower consumer prices. Allowing states to adopt more stringent
product standards of their own poses the risk of one state
extemalizing the costs of its environmental preferences onto outof-state market participants. For instance, if Califomia and several
northeastem states adopt more stringent emission standards for
62
See, e.g., NIVOLA & SHIELDS, supra note 15, at 17 ("Business interests, not
without justification, often prefer nationwide regulatory standards to a
hodgepodge of local rules: broad scope and standardization may lower
uncertainty and increase efficiency."); SCHOENBROD, supra note 13, at 218
(defending federal regulation of pesticide safety because pesticides are
"nationally distributed").
63
Kirsten Engel & Susan Rose-Ackerman, Environmental Federalism in the
United States: The Risks of Devolution, in REGULATORY COMPETITION AND
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 137 (Daniel C. Esty &
Damien Geradin eds., 2001) ("Uniform national regulation may produce
economies of scale of production and distribution for firms selling nationally.").
64
See, e.g., Oates, supra note 12, at 21 ("It would obviously be very costly
for auto manufacturers to have to produce 50 different variants of cars to satisfY
the particular emissions standards of each state.").
65
See TESKE, supra note 21, at 173 ("[W]hile automakers and fuel producers
prefer national regulatory uniformity, stationary sources have just the opposite
interest."). But see, Revesz, supra note 5, at 544 (noting that the argument for
uniformity is "less compelling in the case of process standards"); Esty, supra
note 3, at 618 (noting federal uniform product standards, but not process
standards, "can create important economies of scale for businesses selling these
products").
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automobiles, and this produces a de facto national standard that
increases production costs, consumers in other states may end up
bearing a portion of the costs of more polluted states' preference
for cleaner vehicles. 66
While this argument has some force, it is likely that it has
been oversold. If anything, the costs of meeting a multiplicity of
product standards has declined over time. In _the 1970s it was
certainly the case that varied state tailpipe emission standards
would have increased the cost of automobiles nationwide. At the
time, it would have been difficult for a single factory in Detroit to
tum out vehicles matching the preferences and requirements of
each state. Today, however, in an era of just-in-time inventory
and customized manufacturing, it is not clear that' these premises
apply. Product customization is increasingly common in many
major industries, including automobile manufacture. 67 Consumers
regularly order products; such as home computers, tailor-made to
their specifications. 68 If products can be produced for individual
consumers, production to meet a dozen or more different state
standards cannot be much of a problem. 69 Tailoring products to
meet state standards does not necessarily require manufacturing
66

See TESKE, supra note 21, at 17 (noting adoption of emission regulations in
California may "force" automakers to comply with the standard nationwide
"since it is not feasible to produce two separate sets of cars").
67
See B. JOSEPH PINE II, MASS CUSTOMIZATION: THE NEW FRONTIER IN
BUSINESS COMPETITION 36 (1993) ("The entire [automobile production] process,
from order to delivery-including production, not just movement from
inventory-is heading toward full customization."). "Mass customization
generally refers to the manufacture of one-of-a-kind, 'custom' products via the
use of flexible, computer-controlled mass-production machinery." Eric von
Hippe!, Economics of Product Development by Users: The Impact of "Sticky"
Local Information, 44 MGMT. SCI. 629,631 (1998).
68
The most obvious example of this is Dell Computers Dell is "THE
model for inass customization." Matthew J. Turosz, Mass Customization
a Long Winding Road, KIPLINGER Bus. FORECASTS, Jul. 30, 2001,
http://www.kiplingerforecasts.com.
Other industries in which mass
customization is increasing range from clothing to candy. See Diane Brady,
Customizing for the Masses, Bus. WK., Mar. 20, 2000, at 130B; Julie Scholosser,
Cashing in on the New World ofMe, FORTUNE, Dec. 13, 2004, at 244.
69
This does not mean that mass production of standardized products isn't
less expensive due to economies of scale; it certainly is. See PINE, supra note 67,
at 47-48 (noting that "the benefits of low prices owing to economies of scale and
other cost advantages of mass production are never overcome"). Rather, it is that
the marginal cost of tailoring products to different market segments has dropped
dramatically, and that the technologies and management structures that allow for
mass customization make it feasible and cost-effective to produce state-specific
products in many industries.
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items from scratch. The emergence of electronic emission
controls, for example, could allow manufacturers to tailor vehicle
emissions to the particular demands of specific regional markets. 70
Given these technological advances and resulting changes in
product markets, state-specific product standards may not
necessarily allow one state to externalize the costs of its
environmental preferences on another. 71
A related concern is that the proliferation of state product
standards will inhibit interstate commerce. A multiplicity of
variable mles could sufficiently burden commerce in some goods
and services as to become an obstacle to interstate trade. Insofar
as states may seek to adopt environmental measures that facially
discriminate against out-of-state producers, such measures are
already barred by the dormant commerce clause. 72 Additionally,
the Pike test further bars those state measures which unduly burden
interstate commerce. 73 Whatever the merits of current dormant
commerce clause doctrine, so long as courts continue to enforce
these prohibitions, the ability of states to dismpt interstate
commerce will be limited. Nonetheless, further federal action to
encourage uniformity may be justified in some contexts.

70
See Andrew P. Morriss et a!., Regulating by Litigation: The EPA's
Regulation of Heavy-Duty Diesel Engines, 56 ADMJN. L. REv. 403, 438--40
(2004) (discussing emergence of cost-effective, programmable electronic vehicle
emission controls).
71
The imposition of national product standards also creates opportunities for
rent-seeking, as economic interests seek to gain competitive advantage by
encouraging the adoption of standards that benefit their products and
disadvantage those of their competitors. See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Watching
Paint D1y, 18 REGULATION, Fall 1995, at 23 (describing how national paint
manufacturers sought to use federal standards for evaporative emissions from
paint to disadvantage regional competitors).
72
See Christine A. Klein, The Environmental Commerce Clause, 27 HARv.
ENVTL. L. REv. 1 (2003) (discussing the United States Supreme Court's dormant
commerce clause decisions affecting environmental regulation).
73
See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) ("Where the
statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest,
and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless
the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the
putative local benefits."). See also, e.g., Ark. Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Ark. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 375, 393-95 (1983) (applying the Pike test).
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Race to the Bottom

.One of the more prominent arguments for greater federal
intervention is that the lack of a federal regulatory "floor" will
result in a destructive "race to the bottom," in which states adopt
suboptimally lax environinental protections in a futile effort to
attract off-setting levels of economic investment. 74 As commonly
explained, this competition creates downward pressure as each
state seeks to attract business by reducing its environmental
safeguards below the levels maintained by competing jurisdictions.
As Professor Richard Stewart observed three decades ago, "[i]f
each locality reasons in the same way, all will adopt lower
standards of environmental quality than they would prefer if there
were some binding mechanism that enabled theni simultaneously
to enact higher standards, thus eliminating the threatened loss of
industry or development." 75 Thus, the theory goes, interstate
competition will result in suboptimally lax environmental
regulations even where there are not direct spillovers from one
jurisdiction into another.
One immediate problem with the race to the bottom theory is
its static view of the trade-off between economic development and
environmental protection. Insofar as it is possible to reduce the
costs of environmental regulation without sacrificing existing
levels of environmental protection, government efforts to create a
more business-friendly regulatory climate need not produce

74

See, e.g., CLIFFORD RECHTSCHAFFEN & DAVID L. MARKELL, REINVENTING
ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT AND THE STATE/FEDERAL RELATIONSHIP 22-25
(2003) (noting that the race-to-the-bottom theory is "one of the central
underpinnings of federal environmental regulation"); WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE
HOME VOTER HYPOTHESIS 162 (2001) (noting "a widespread belief that
competition among jurisdictions poses a danger of a mutually destructive 'race to
the bottom"'); Esty, supra note 3, at 628 ("Fears of a welfare-reducing race to
the bottom represent one of the central underpinnings of federal environmental
regulation in the United States."). Perhaps the ftrst to suggest the "race to the
bottom" justification for federal environmental regulation was Richard Stewart.
See Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice?: Problems of Federalism in
Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE
L.J. 1196, 1212 (1977). See also Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental
Standard-Setting: Is There a "Race" and Is It "to the Bottom"?, 48 HASTINGS
L.J. 271, 367-74 (1997); Peter P. Swire, The Race to Laxity and the Race to
Undesirability: Explaining Failures in Competition Among Jurisdictions in
Environmental Law, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. (SYMPOSIUM ISSUE) 67, 68, 107
(1996).
.
Stewart, supra note 74, at 1212.
~
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suboptimal levels of environmental protection. 76 At the same time,
business interests often have their own reasons for supporting
greater levels of environmental protection, 77 including the effect of
environmental conditions on labor supply. States are not only
competing for industry, but for workers and taxpayers as well.
Moreover, as incomes rise, so does the demand for environmental
protection, so states that fail to maintain high levels of
environmental protection risk driving away· residents to other
states. 78
Additional problems with the race-to-the-bottom theory have
been identified by Professor Richard L. Revesz. 79 First, as Revesz
points out, there is no reason to assume that interjurisdictional
competition in environinental policy is any less likely to produce
optimal results or is otherwise less reliable than such competition
in other contexts. 80 While it is plausible that interjurisdctional
competition could produce suboptimal results due to game
theoretic interactions, there is no a priori reason to assume that the
result would be state standards that are suboptimally lax, rather
than sub optimally stringent. 81 Assuming that there is a race to the
76

This argument is made in greater detail in Adler, supra note 47, at 226.
Of course, sometimes business interests support environmental regulation
for rent-seeking reasons. See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Clean Politics, Dirty
Profits: Rent-Seeking Behind the Green Curtain,
in POLITICAL
ENV1RONMENTALISM: GOING BEHIND THE GREEN CURTAIN 1, 2 (Terry L.
Anderson ed., 2000) ("As the costs of environmental regulations increase, so
does the value of potential comparative advantages that environmental
regulations can create. Seeking regulatory policies that will carve out niche
markets or inhibit competitors becomes ... increasingly profitable."); Todd J.
Zywicki, Environmental Externalities and Political Externalities: The_Political
Economy of Environmental Regulation and Reform, 73 TUL. L. REv. 845, 856873 (1999) (describing various examples of industrial rent-seeking in the context
of environmental regulation); ENV1RONMENTAL POLITICS: PUBLIC COSTS,
PRIVATE REWARDS (Michael S. Greve & Fred L. Smith, Jr. eds., 1992).
78
See Deborah Jones Merritt, Commerce!, 94 MICH. L. REv. 674, 706 (1995)
("Residents have flocked to some western states that use aggressive measures to
protect the environment-despite the fact that these laws impose significant costs
on business and taxpayers.").
79
See Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking
the "Race-to-the-Bottom" Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1210 (1992).
80
See id. at 1211-12.
81
See id. at 1241-42. Advocates of the race-to-the-bottom theory also
acknowledge this. point. See, e.g., Engel, supra note 74, at 345 ("[I]t is unclear
whether this . strategic interaction prompts states to establish more or less
stringent standards."). It is also possible that, in some circumstances, the
adoption of a federal regulatory "floor" could result in less state regulation, and
77
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"bottom," and that state standards are insufficiently stringent,
federal regulation might not solve the problem. Environmental
regulation is not the only variable in which states compete for
business investment. 82 If a federal standard prevents competition
in environmental standards, states will compete in other areas.
Indeed, if the race-to-the-bottom argument can justify federal
environmental standards, it could justify the federalization of just
about everything.
Another problem with the race to the bottom theory, as noted
by economist William Fischel, is the dominant role of homeowners
in local politics, which can often produce a ''Not in My Back
Yard" ("NIMBY") reaction to proposed changes ,in land use. 83
Homeowners tend to be very risk averse about local changes or
developments that have the potential to depress land values, and
this risk aversion "pervades all of local political decisions. " 84
Even those homeowners who are not particularly concerned about
the environmental effects of proposed developments or industrial
activities are likely to recognize that prospective buyers might
be. 85 As a result, Fischel goes so far as to argue that local
governments are "the least likely candidates for a 'race to the
bottom' of the environmental ladder" and that "local governments
are, if anything, inclined to accept too little garden-variety
industry" and other environmentally harmfulland-uses. 86
Theory aside, empirical evidence of a race to the bottom in
environmental policy is conspicuously lacking. 87 While there are
some studies finding that the stringency of environmental
regulation can affect industry siting decisions, 88 and survey data
indicating that such effects may influence state-level
environmental policy decisions, 89 the available empirical evidence
even less aggregate environmental protection, than if the federal regulations were
not adopted. See Jonathan H. Adler, Why States Regulate: The Impact of
Federal Action on State Regulatory Choices (draft, on file with author).
82
See Richard Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A
Normative Critique, in THE NEW FEDERALISM: CAN THE STATES BE TRUSTED?
105-07 (John Ferejohn & BarryR. Weingast eds., 1997).
83
FISCHEL, supra note 74, at 163.
84 Id.
~ 5 Id. at 163-64
86
!d. at 163, 183.
87
See Oates, supra note 12, at 11-17 (summarizing empirical literature).
88
See id. at 15~16.
89
See, e.g., Engel, supra note 74, at 340-47.
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cannot sustain the claim that interjurisdictional competitiOn
produces suboptimally lax environmental regulation. 90 The fact
that many states adopted federal regulation in advance of the
federal government, and that in some cases those states with the
most to lose from regulation were the first to act, 91 would strongly
suggest otherwise. Further evidence suggests that, at least in some
environmental contexts, any "race" among jurisdictions is "to the
top," as states seem more likely to increase their environmental
efforts in response to neighboring jurisdictions' actions than to
relax regulation. 92 Moreover, some states may rationally opt to
reduce environmental protection in one area so as to facilitate
greater environmental gains in another context. This is evidence
of variable state preferences, not a race to the "bottom" of
environmental protection. In short, despite its prominence in
environmental policy discussions, the "race-to-the-bottom" theory
is not a particularly strong basis upon which to rest the case for
federal intervention.
E.

Interest Groups and Institutional Competence

There may be other institutional or public choice reasons to
expect state and local govemments to be less able to address
environmental concems than the federal government, even in the
absence of spillovers or economies of scale. For instance, some
argue that collective action problems and the threat of special
interest influences are greater at the state than federal level. 93

90

Several economic studies have failed to find empirical evidence of any
race to the bottom in environmental policy. See, e.g., DanielL. Millimet & Jolm
A List, A Natural Experiment on the 'Race to the Bottom' Hypothesis: Testing
for Stochastic Dominance in Temporal Pollution Trends, 65 OXFORD BULL.
EcoN. & STAT. 395 (2003); Daniel L. Millimet, Assessing the Empirical Impact
of Environmental Federalism, 43 J. REGIONAL SCI. 711 (2003); John A List &
Shelby Gerking, Regulat01y Federalism and Environmental Protection in the
United States, 40 J. REGIONAL Sci. 453 (2000).
91
See, Adler, Wetlands, supra note 49, at 47-53.
92
See Oates, supra note 12, at I 5 ("States appear to be 'pulled' to higher
levels of abatement spending by more stringent measures in neighbouring states,
but relatively lax regulations nearby appear to have no effect on such
expenditures."); TESKE, supra note 21, at 180-81 (fmding states are more likely
to increase, rather than decrease, air quality regulation in response to actions
taken in neighboring states, and concluding that tllis "suggests that the race to the
bottom is not a factor here"); id. at 191-92 (fmding the same pattern in
groundwater regulation).
93
See, e.g., Esty, supra note 3, at 597-98; Stewart, supra note 74, at 1213.

2005]

MISMATCH IN ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM

155

~

While there are certainly collective action problems at the state
level that inhibit the adoption of environmental measures, there is
no reason to assume that such problems are lesser at the national
level. If anything, given wide diversity in environmental problems
and ~references across the country, the opposite is likely to be
true. 4 More important, as with the "race-to-the-bottom" theory,
the empirical evidence that states face particularly acute public
•
choice problems is lacking. 95
·Whatever the imperfections of state and local governmentsand there are many-these "flawed institutions" were the first to
address air pollution and other environmental problems. 96
Historically, state and local governments began to address most
major environmentalproblems well before the federal government
got into the act. As knowledge and awareness of specific
environmental problems and their causes accumulated, state and
local governments began to act. In the six years following
publication of Rachel Carson's Silent Springn-arguably the book
most responsible for awakening the nation's environmental
consciousness 98-states with air pollution laws increased from
sixteen to forty-six. 99 This change was driven by a shift in public
opinion. For example, the percentage of Americans who believed
air pollution to be a serious problem increased from 28 percent in
1965 to 69 percent by 1970. 10 Cities like Pittsburgh adopted local
measures to address air quality precisely because the federal
government (and, at the time, state governments) was unwilling to
act. 101 Interestingly enough, such measures were adopted with the

°

94

See BUTLER & MACEY, supra note 2, at 46-47.
See generally Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental
Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis, 115 HARv. L. REv. 553 (2001)
(presenting empirical data that challenges the view that states are ineffective
environmental regulators); see also, TESKE, supra note 21, at 165-92.
96
SCHOENBROD, supra note 13, at 221-22.
97
RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962).
98
Silent Spring is not without its share of critics, even to this day. See, e.g,
CHARLES T. RUBIN, THE GREEN CRUSADE: RETHINKING THE ROOTS OF
ENVIRONMENTALISM 29-52 (1994).
99
SCHOENBROD, supra note 13, at 10 (citing MARY GRAHAM, THE MORNING
AFTER EARTH DAY: THE PRACTICAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 44 (1999)).
100
S. ROBERT LICHTER & STANLEY ROTHMAN, ENVIRONMENTAL CANCER-A
POLITICAL DISEASE? 9 (1999).
101
See FISCHEL, supra note 74, at 168-69; see also ROY LUBOVE,
TWENTIETH-CENTURY
PITTSBURGH:
GOVERNMENT,
BUSINESS,
AND
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE 106-.Q?, 114-19 (1969).
95
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support of local business leaders, not over their opposition; indeed,
in the 1940s U.S. Steel threatened to leave Pittsburgh because
there was too little air pollution control. 102 This instance was not
an aberration; several other local governments recognized the need
to adopt environmental measures so as to prevent industrial flight
to cleaner jurisdictions. 103
Today, state capacity and willingness to address
environmental problems remains substantial. The nation's state
environmental agencies employ approximately 60,000 people, over
three times the number employed by the EP A. 104
State
environmental agencies also perform the majority of inspections
and enforcement actions. 105 Moreover, states exceed federal
minimum standards in many areas. While there are cases in which
state environmental policy decisions are influenced by rentseeking and interest group politics, 106 this is no less true at the
federal level. Indeed, in some cases industry groups seek federal
regulation to preempt potentially more stringent state and local
rules. 107 Empirical studies of state regulatory activity generally
fail to support the claim that state governments are more
susceptible to interest group pressure than the federal

102

FISCHEL, supra note 74, at 169. As Fischel notes, this "turns the
conventional 'race to the bottom' scenario on its head," as local governments had
to enact more stringent environmental measures to keep local industry. Jd.
103
!d. at 169-70; cf INDUR GOKLANY, CLEARING THE AIR: THE REAL STORY
OF THEWAR ON AIR POLLUTION (1999); Arthur C. Stem, Hist01y ofAir Pollution
Legislation in the United States, 32 1. AIR POLLUTION CONTROL Ass'N 44, 44
(1982).
.
104
NIVOLA & SHIELDS, supra note 15, at 30 (statistics quoted are -accurate as
of2001).
105
David L. Markell, The Role of Deterrence-Based Enforcement in a

"Reinvented" State/Federal Relationship: The Divide BelYveen TheOI)' and
Reality, 24 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 1, 32 (2000) (states are responsible for up to
90 percent of all facility inspections and environmental enforcement actions);
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-98-113, EPA's AND STATES'
EFFORTS TO FOCUS STATE ENFORCEMENT PROGRAMS ON RESULTS 16 (1998),
available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/rc98113.pdf (noting that states
accounted for 85 percent of enforcement actions in 1996).
106
See supra note 77.
107
See E. Donald Elliott et al., Toward a The01y of Statutory Evolution: The
Federalization of Environmental Law, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 313,330-33 (1985);
see also Revesz, supra note 95 at 577 (noting that industry will, at times, seek
federal preemption of more stringent state standards); TESKE, supra note 21, at
17 (citing examples of business support of federal regulation to preempt state
regulation).
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t 108
governmen.

Ill. JURISDICTIONAL MISMATCH
Turning to the present state of environmental policy, the
division of authority and responsibility in environmental policy
does not comport with the analytical framework sketched above.
Nor does it comport with any particular analytical framework or
theory of the proper federal-state balance in environmental policy.
Rather, it is the result of an almost haphazard accretion of
regulatory statutes ·over the past several decades. 109 The result is a
. mismatch between the analytical bases for federal intervention and
the actual contours of federal intervention in environmental
policy-a jurisdictional mismatch that is greater than that which
would be caused by the failure of legal and political jurisdictions
to track the scope and extent of various environmental concerns.
This mismatch has significant consequences for environmental
protection. It is inefficient and, at times, environmentally harmful.
As illustrated by the examples that follow, the jurisdictional
mismatch in environmental policy has hampered environmental
protection in some significant respects.

A. ·Federal Action
The federal government is intensely involved in myriad
environmental problems that are truly local in character. Drinking
water, underground storage tanks, and hazardous waste sites are all
problems that lack the features that would justify . federal
regulation, yet federal requirements for such intrastate concerns
are sometimes more stringent than mandates to prevent interstate
harms. 110 Even where a federal role can be justified, as in the case
of air pollution that may drift across jurisdictional lines, the federal

108

See TESKE, supra note 21, at 196 ("[C]omplete capture of state regulation
is rare and usually limited in time.").
109
Some of this accretion is itself the result of haphazard or accidental events.
See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Fables of the Cuyahoga: Reconstructing a History
ofEnvironmental Protection, 14 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 89 (2002) (discussing the
role of an accidental 1969 river fire in spurring passage of the Clean Water Act
and other federal environmental laws).
110
See NIVOLA & SHJELDS, supra note 15, at 35 (noting that federal authority
mandating waste site cleanups is stronger than those provisions addressing
interstate air and water pollution in the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act,
respectively).
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government's involvement does not COITespond with the federal
government's interest. For example, cunent federal air quality
regulations focus far more on whether a given metropolitan area
meets national ambient air quality standards and on the
development state plans to meet such standards than on interstate
air pollution. 111 Moreover, those provisions targeted at such
spillovers have only rarely been invoked with any success.
Regulation of drinking water quality is perhaps the
paradigmatic example of a local enviromnental concern regulated
under federal law.
Under the Safe Drinking Water Act
("SDWA"), the federal government sets maximum thresholds for
identified contaminants with which all local water systems must
Although variances from federal standards are
comply. 112
available in some instances, 113 as a practical matter, the SDWA
sets uniform drinking water standards for the entire nation.
Federal drinking water standards cannot be justified on the
grounds of interstate spillovers, as drinking water quality in one
community seldom, if ever, has an effect upon drinking water in
neighboring jurisdictions, let alone states half a nation away. 114
Both the costs and benefits of more protective standards fall on
users of the drinking water system. 115 Accordingly, state and local
governments made "significant strides" to improve drinking water
111

See Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 249 (1976) (noting that the
State Implementation Plan provisions are the "heart" of the Clean Air Act). As a
practical matter, it may be more accurate to say that the primary federal focus is
on the existence of State Implementation Plans for meeting the National Ambient
Air Quality Standards, rather than on the actual attainment of the standards. See
generally COMM. ON AIR QUALITY MGMT. U.S., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, AIR
QUALITY MANAGEMENT IN THE UNJTED STATES (2004) (noting significant
progress in developing SIPs, and NAAQSs, as well limited success in attaining
NAAQSs).
112
See 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1 (b)(l)(A) (2000).
113
See 42 U.S.C. § 300g-4 (2000) (providing for variances from national
primary drinking water regulations).
114
See Paul R. Portney, Environmental Policy in the Next Centwy, in
SETTING NATIONAL PRIORITIES: THE 2000 ELECTION AND BEYOND 359, 379
(Henry J. Aaron & Robert D. Reischauer eds., 1999) ("[F]or all but a few
biological contaminants in drinking water, the risks linked with higher
concentrations of most contaminants would be borne only by those who consume
the affected water for a lifetime.").
115
See Terry M. Dinan et a!., Environmental Federalism: Welfare Losses
ji-om Uniform National Drinldng Water Standards, in ENVIRONMENTAL AND
PUBLIC ECONOMICS: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF WALLACE E. OATES 13, 14 (Arvind
Panagariya et al. eds., 1999).
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~ protection before the passage of the federal SDWA. 116

While
federal standards were adopted, in part, due to concerns that local
efforts may have been underprotective, the imposition of
nationally uniform drinking water standards may have produced
large net welfare losses) 17
Drinking water is a local good produced by local ·water
systems, so there are no economies of scale in the setting of
uniform national standards. If states lack the expertise to identify
the proper contaminant thresholds, it would justify the
promulgation of federal guidelines to better inform local decisionmaking.118 It would not, however, justify imposition of a federal
rule. Similarly, if state and local governments lack the capacity to
monitor and maintain drinking water quality, this could justify
financial and technical support from the federal ·government, but
not mandatory standards. 119
· Other justifications for federally imposed standards on local
drinking water systems are equally unavailing. For instance, were
one to accept the race to the bottom theory as a justification for
federal environmental regulation generally, it would not justify the
federal regulation of drinking water, as the imposition of local
drinking water standards does not, in itself, increase compliance
costs for local industry. 120 Insofar as local communities adopt less
stringent drinking water standards than those who live elsewhere
may like, the communities themselves bear the brunt of the risk. A
116

Id. at 27.
Id. at 27-28. While recent SDWA reforms may reduce the welfare losses
from uniform standards, they will not eliminate them. !d. at 28.
118
See id. at 29.
119
It may also be relevant that bottled water represents an increasing
117

proportion of American water consumption, diminishing the perceived
importance of federal regulation in this area. According to the International
Bottled Water Association ("IBWA"), per capita annual bottled water
consumption increased ten-fold from 1976 to 1999, from 1.6 gallons to
17 gallons. See lNT'L BOTTLED WATER ASSOC., U.S. BOTTLED WATER
MARKET
VOLUME,
GROWTH,
CONSUI\1PTION:
1976-1999
{2002),
http://www.bottledwater.org/public/BWFactsHome_main.htrn.
120
Under the Federal Superfund statute, drinking water standards can form
the basis for waste site cleanup standards, and therefore more stringent drinking
water standards could trigger more stringent cleanup requirements. 42 U.S.C.
§ 9621(d){2){A)(i) (2000). This is a function of federal law, however, and not
inherent in the regulation of drinking water quality. Moreover, the basic
structure of the SDWA was put in place in 1974, years before enactment of the
Federal Superfund statute, and therefore could not serve as a justification for the
federal presence in this area in the first place.
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transient visitor has little to fear from drinking water that local
residents ingest 365 days per year. 121
Drinking water is not the only example of a clearly local
matter that is regulated by federal law and not justified by
interstate spillovers or other multi-jurisdictional concerns. Federal
law governs cleanup standards for local waste sites 122 and
underground storage tanks, 123 as well as air and water quality
concerns that do not cross jurisdictional lines. 124 Indeed, it is fair
to say that the bulk of federal environmental regulations on the
books concern matters that do not directly address interstate
spillovers or benefit from the sort of economies of scale that would
justify federal regulation.
B.

Federal Abdication

While the federal government is hyperactive in its focus on
local environmental concerns, it is less active in those areas where
the case for federal involvement is the strongest. The federal
government is relatively absent when it comes to addressing
interstate spillovers, and it has been deficient in providing the
scientific and technical foundation for environmental regulatory
efforts. The federal government has been more responsible in
efforts to provide for national public goods, such as national parks
and the like, though here, too, federal efforts are far from ideal. It
chronically underfunds National Park maintenance and restoration,
while spending money '\mwisely and even extravagantly" on new
constmction. 125 The result is substantial pollution and ecological
degradation of national public goods within federal care. 126 Even
121

See SCHOENBROD, supra note 13, at 177 ("The water that residents provide
for themselves is generally safe for visitors .... Transients drinking water with
50 ppb arsenic are probably at much great~r risk from being killed by a toppling
vending machine while buying a soft drink").
122
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2000).
123
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6991-699Ii (2000).
124
See 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (2000) (setting National Ambient Air Quality
Standards for local areas); 33 U.S.C. §§ 13 I 1-1313, 1342 (2000) (setting
effluent limitations and water quality standards for all waters irrespective of
interstate effects).
125
See Holly Lippke Fretwell & Michael Podolsky, A Strategy for Restoring
America's National Paries, 13 DUKE ENVTL. L. & PoL'Y F. 143, 149-50, 153
(2003).
126
For discussions of the impact of this type of neglect on National Parks,
see, for example, ALSTON CHASE, PLA YJNG GOD IN YELLOWSTONE: THE
DESTRUCTION OF AMERICA'S FIRST NATIONAL PARK (1986); KARL HESS, JR.,
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where the federal government manages resources that are not
necessarily public goods of national importance, the results are
distressing. One salient example is the management of the
National Forests, where the federal government loses money on
timber sales, and chronic mismanagement has led to ecosystem
decline and a literally explosive threat of catastrophic wildflre. 127
Federal agencies are also responsible for thousands of
contaminated waste sites that will likely cost in excess of $250
billion to clean. 128 Compounding the problems with state and local
environmental efforts, federal facilities are not always subject to
the same civil penalties for polluting activities as are private
facilities. 129

ROCKY TIMES IN ROCKY MOUNTAIN NATIONAL PARK: AN UNNATURAL HISTORY
{1993) (criticizing the gross mismanagement in Rocky Mountain National Park);
Fretwell & Podolsky, supra note 125, at 149-53 (giving specific examples of
crumbling infrastructure in National Parks, as well as general degradation of the
natural resources within those parks).
127
See Holly Lippke Fretwell, Forests: Do We Get What We Pay For?
(Prop. & Envtl. Research Ctr., Public Lands Report II, 1999), available
at http://www.perc.org/perc.php?id=135; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
GAO/RCED-99-65, WESTERN NATIONAL FORESTS: A COHESIVE STRATEGY
NEEDED TO ADDRESS CATASTROPHIC WILDFIRE THREATS 22-31 (1999),
available at http://www'.gao.gov/archive/1999/rc99065.pdf (noting that an
estimated 39 million acres of federal lands are at risk of catastrophic wildfire);
see generally Donald Leal, Turning a Profit on Public Forests (Prop. & Env't
Research
Ctr.
Policy
Series
No. . 4,
1995),
available
at
http://www.perc.org/perc.php?id=639 (discussing poor timber profits); ROBERT
H. NELSON, A BURNING ISSUE: A CASE FOR ABOLISHING THE U.S. FOREST
SERVICE (2000) (discussing the threat of catastrophic wildfire due to
management decisions).
128
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-96-150, FEDERAL
FACILITIES: CONSISTENT RELEVANT RISK EVALUATIONS NEEDED FOR
PRIORITIZING CLEANUPS 29 (1996), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/
1996/rc96150.pdf. See also David Armstrong, Government as Polluter: More
Costly Cleanup on Horizon, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 14, 1999, at A32 (reporting
costs of cleaning up Department of Defense sites).
129
See ROBIN KUNDIS CRAIG, THE CLEAN WATER ACT AND THE
CONSTITUTION: LEGAL STRUCTURE AND THE PUBLIC'S RIGHT TO A CLEAN AND
HEALTHY ENVIRONMENT 82 (2004) (discussing federal immunity from civil
penalties under the Clean Water Act); see also Melinda R. Kassen, The

Inadequacies of Congressional Attempts to Legislate Federal Facility
Compliance with Environmental Requirements, 54 MD. L. REV. 1475 (1995)
(discussing federal claims of immunity from civil penalties under RCRA and
CERCLA).
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1. · Interstate Spillovers
Federal intervention is probably most needed to address
interstate spillover concerns. 130 Only a small portion of current
federal regulations qan bejustified on these grounds, however. 131
More significantly,· these provisimis have been invoked only
rarely, and even then downwind states have been more aggressive
at seeking to control interstate spillovers than has the federal
government. For over two decades, the EPA made no significant
effort to address such concerns, focusing instead on air quality in
urban centers. As even those who support a fairly aggressive
federal environmental presence acknowledge, the "EPA has not
done a very good job of addressing transbotmdary pollution." 132 In
some cases, existing federal environmental laws may have
exacerbated interstate pollution problems, such as by encouraging
the use of taller smoke stacks that will send polluting emissions
further downwind. 133
While the Clean Air Act contains a few provisions that
specifically address interstate pollution concerns, the EPA has
largely ignored these measures. Indeed, where states sought to
invoke the Act to obtain relief for upwind contributions to local air
pollution, the EPA refused to act, and federal courts largely
validated the federal government's desire to ignore interstate air
pollution. 134 Only recently has the EPA responded to states
seeking to control emissions from upwind states that contribute to
downwind nonattainment of federal air quality standards. 135 For
over two decades, EPA made no significant effort to address such
concerns, focusing instead on air quality in urban centers. 136 The
Clean Water Act also authorizes the EPA to address trans~oundary
130

See supra Part II.A.
See Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Interstate Environmental
Externalities, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 2341, 2347--49 (1998) (noting, for example,
that "the core of the CleanAir Act" provides "an ineffective and poorly targeted
means of dealing with the problem of interstate externalities").
132
Rena I. Steinzor, EPA and Its Sisters at 30: Devolution, Revolution, or
Reform?, 31 ENVTL.L.REP. 11086, 11092 (2001).
133
See Revesz, supra Iiote 5, at 541--42 (noting that the number of stacks
taller than 500 feet increased from two in 1970 to over 180 in 1985, and arguing
that this was due, in part, to incentives created by the Clean Air Act of 1970).
134
See Merrill, supra note 34, at 959.
135
See Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663, 669, 672 (D.C. Cir. 2000);
Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 249 F.3d 1032 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
136
See Revesz, supra note 131, at 2349-74.
131
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·pollution, but here again the federal government has been largely
absent, rarely invoking the relevant provisions. 137 This federal
abdication is all the more troubling for state environmental
protection efforts as federal statutes largely preempt preexisting
remedies for interstate nuisances under federal common law. 138
Policymakers may have ·voiced concerns about interstate
externalities when adopting federal environrhental statues, 139 but
such concerns are scarcely evident in the environmental provisions
of the U.S. Code as they represent only a tiny portion of federal
pollution control law.

2.

Economies of Scale

Economies of scale suggest that the federal government
should actively fund scientific research about environmental
problems, collect data, and support the development of pollution
control strategies, even if they are not imposed on local
jurisdictions. 140 Yet the state of knowledge about environmental
problems, their causes and extent, remains quite poor. Much
environmental- regulation has proceeded despite a lack of basic
data about the nature of current environmental problems and
incomplete scientific understanding of the problems in question.
These problems are compounded by the politicization and
manipulation of science within the regulatory process. 141 While
state and local governments could benefit from federal research
identifying the nature and causes of various environmental
problems, as well as from comparative analyses of potential
environmental protection policies, they get far less federal support
of this type than is warranted by the economies of scale in
scientific research. Given the amount of resources devoted to
forcing state and local compliance with federal standards,
particularly federal process standards, this deficiency IS
137

See Merrill, supra note 34, at 960-61.
See City of Milwaukee v. illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981); see also Robert
Percival, The Clean Water Act and the Demise of the Federal Common Law of
Interstate Nuisance, 55 ALA. L. REv. 717 (2004).
139
See Esty, supra note 3, at 624 n.l96 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 940117 (1976);
H.R. Rep. No. 95-294 (1977)) (stating that Congress considered interstate
externalities when adopting Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977).
140
See supra Part II.A.
141
See generally E. Donald Elliott, Strengthening Science's Voice at EPA, 66
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 45, 45-46 (2003) (describing EPA's "tendency to run
roughshod over science to follow the political winds").
138
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particularly striking.
In 197 0, the President's Council on Environmental Quality
reported that existing government efforts did "not provide the type
of information or coverage necessary to evaluate the condition of
the nation's environment or to chart changes in its quality and
trace their causes." 142 Although the federal government spends
over $600 million each year on environmental data collection, in
addition to private, state, and local efforts, there is no
"comprehensive account on the state of the nation's
ecosystems." 143 As noted in a recent report by the Heinz Center
titled The State of the Nation's Ecosystems, "[f]or a nation deeply
committed to protecting the environment, this is an unacceptable
state of affairs." 144
The Heinz Center report sought to address the lack of reliable
and comprehensive environmental data by developing and
publishing a series of indicators of ecosystem health. While still
underway, this project was hampered by the lack of adequate data,
as some or all of the necessary data was missing for nearly 70
percent of the chosen indicators. 145 The report noted there was
sufficient data to report nationally on only 58 of the 103 chosen
indicators; 146 complete data only existed for only thirty-three
indicators. 147 Thirty-one indicators had "inadequate data," and
fourteen indicators were not repmied at all. 148 In some cases the
data was unreliable, inconsistent, or incomplete. In others cases
the report suggested the gaps could be filled with relatively little
effort. The report concluded that "until and unless these gaps are
filled, Americans will not have access to a complete picture of the
'state of the nation's ecosystems."' 149 In other words, after over
thirty years of substantial federal environmental regulation, there is
no adequate measurement of overall ecosystem health.
142

COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY: THE FIRST

237 (1970).
H. JOHN HEINZ III CTR. FOR SCI., ECON. AND THE ENV'T, THE STATE OF

ANNuAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
143

THE NATION'S ECOSYSTEMS:
LIVING RESOURCES OF THE

MEASURJNG THE LANDS, WATERS, AND
UNITED STATES 3 (2002), available at

http://www.heinzctr.org/ecosystems/pdf_files/sotne_complete.pdf.
144 Id.
145
See id. at 203.
146
Jd. at 18.
147 Jd.
148
The remaining twenty-five indicators had "some" data. Id.
149 Jd.
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Other studies confirm the general fmdings of the Heinz Center
report. For instance, a recent study conducted for Resources for
the Future on the use of science at the EPA, concluded that "the
state of environmental science is characterized by chronic lack of
data and a primitive understanding of many biological, physical,
and ecological processes." 150 Additionally, "monitoring data" on
pollutants are "generally unavailable for most substances," and the
"[a]vailable data tend to be sparse, of poor quality, or both." 151
This problem is likely to persist as the percentage of EPA's budget
devoted to research has declined substantially since the agency's
founding in 1970. 152 Yet the problem is not merely a lack of data,
as EPA scientists "also lack a fundamental mechanistic
understanding of how pollutants cause harm." 153 Some of these
deficiencies are due to the institutional and political incentives
facing EPA officials. 154
For years the Government Accountability Office (formerly
known as the General Accounting Office, "GAO") has
documented widespread gaps in environmental data and scientific
research. In 1995, GAO told Congress about "numerous longstanding problems with EPA's efforts to collect and manage the
scientific data that form the basis of regulatory decisions." 155

a

150

MARK R. POWELL, SCIENCE AT EPA: INFORMATION IN THE REGULATORY
PROCESS 125 (1999) (but also noting that "the current state of science is
generally sufficient to provide a basis for sound regulatory decisions in routine
cases in which the stakes ... are relatively low"); see also U.S.
GEN.
ACCOUNTING
OFFICE,
GA0-05-458,
CHEMICAL
REGULATION:
OPTIONS EXIST TO ll\1PROVE EPA'S ABILITY TO ASSESS HEALTH RISKS AND
MANAGE ITS CHEMICAL REVIEW PROGRAM (2005),
available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05458.pdf (noting lack of data on risks posed by
chemical substances subject to EPA regulation).
151
POWELL, supra note 150, at 126.
152
See id. at 2-3 (noting that one-third of EPA's budget once funded the
Office of Research and Development, but that "ORD's budget now hovers in the
single digits").
153
!d. at 126.
154
For instance, Powell observes that "environmental data collection falls in
and out of favor over time, resulting in a discontinuous series of broad, shallow
efforts." !d. at 112. Moreover, EPA is fundamentally a "regulatory agency"
rather than a "science agency," and it is "dominated by a legalistic culture that
often looks for engineering-based solutions to meet statutory obligations." Id. at
2.
See also Elliott, supra note 141; MARc K. LANDY ET AL., THE
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY: ASKING THE WRONG QUESTIONS (1994).
155
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/T-RCED-95-174, ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION: EPA'S PROBLEMS WITH COLLECTION AND MANAGEMENT OF
SCIENTIFIC DATA AND ITS EFFORTS TO ADDRESS THEM 1 (1995), available at
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Specifically, GAO noted that "[m]any of EPA's scientific data sets
are either incomplete, obsolete, or missing altogether, a problem
that extends across all media areas." 156 In addition, GAO reported
that the EPA's "problems in obtaining quality data are exacerbated
by difficulties in managing the data that are available." 157 GAO
noted that these problems were "longstanding" and were not
confined to one or two isolated program areas. 158
While there have been efforts to address chronic gaps in data
and scientific research over the past decade, substantial problems
remain. In 1999, GAO reported that the EPA lacks fundamental
scientific environmental data concerning various pollutants and
their effects on human and ecosystem health. 159 In 2000, GAO
concluded that the EPA's national water quality inventory "does
not accurately portray water quality conditions nationwide," in
large part because data are only collected for a small percentage of
the nation's waters. 160 Not only does the EPA not collect
sufficient data, but it does not ensure consistency and compatibility
across state-collected data. 161 GAO concluded that "the dearth of
the waters actually monitored, combined with the wide variation
among states' monitoring and assessment approaches, make the
national statistics umeliable and subject to misinterpretation and,
therefore, of limited usefi.llness .... " 162
These are not isolated findings. A 2003 GAO study reported
that "[n ]o federal entity has comprehensively assessed the
availability and use of freshwater to meet the nation's needs in 25
years. " 163 It fi.1rther reported that state water managers believed
http://archive.gao.gov/t2pbat 1/154 23 8 .pdf.
156 !d.
157 !d.
158
!d. at 3.
159
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-99-261, ENVIRONMENTAL
INFORMATION: EPA Is TAKJNG STEPS TO IMPROVE INFORlvlATION
MANAGEMENT, BUT CHALLENGES REMAJN 4-5 (1999), available at
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/rc99261.pdf ("These extensive data gaps are a
result both of a lack of fundamental scientific lmowledge and of inadequate data
collection, according to EPA and others.").
160
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-00-54, WATER QUALITY:
KEY EPA AND STATE DECISIONS LIMITED BY INCONSISTENT AND INCOMPLETE
DATA 5 (2000), available at http://www .gao.gov/archive/2000/rc00054.pdf.
161
!d. at 6.
162 !d.
163
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GA0-03-514, FRESHWATER SUPPLY:
STATES' VIEWS ·oF HOW FEDERAL AGENCIES COULD HELP THEM MEET THE
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-that more water data and greater flexibility in complying with
federal environmental laws would help states to meet their water
resource needs. 164 The National Research Council, a division of
the National Academy of Sciences ("NAS") likewise reported that
"observational networks to measure various water characteristics
have been in decline during the last 30 years because of political
and fiscal instabilities." 165 This is particularly true for systems
monitoring "streamflow, groundwater, sediment transport, water
quality and water use." 166 Although the "number, complexity, and
severity of water problems are growing," the NAS found that
investment in the scientific studies necessary to address such
problems has "stagnated." 167 The NAS panel found that too much
of current research is focused on short-term concerns and "[t]oo
little of it is focused on the kind of fundamental, integrated,
longer-term research that will be required if current and emerging
water problems are to be addressed successfully."168
A 2001 report by the National Academy of Public
Administration ("NAPA") also found major deficiencies in the
EPA's information systems for overseeing and monitoring state
and federal environmental program performance. 169 The NAPA
report further found that
[D]ata from EPA and state systems are hard to use in
assessing changes of environmental conditions at specific
locations and in evaluating the environmental and compliance
performance of individual facilities, groups of facilities, or
responsible government agencies. As a result, Congress, EPA,
state legislatures, and the public cannot readily evaluate the
effectiveness, efficiency, or equity of federal and state

CHALLENGES
OF
EXPECTED
SHORTAGES
44 (2003), available at
http://www .gao.gov/new.items/d03514.pdf.
164
Jd. at 76. Of course, state water managers also stated that they would
benefit from greater financial assistance. Id. at 77.
165

COMM. ON ASSESSMENT OF WATER REs. RESEARCH, NAT'L RESEARCH
COUNCIL, CONFRONTING THE NATION'S WATER PROBLEMS: THE ROLE OF
RESEARCH 180 (2004).
166
167
168

Jd. at 195.
Jd. at 16.
Jd.
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See NAT'L ACAD. OF PUB. ADMIN., EVALUATING ENVIRONMENTAL
PROGRESS: HOW EPA AND THE STATES CAN IMPROVE THE QUALITY OF
ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE INFORMATION 1-5 (2001), available at
http://www.napawash.org/pc_economy_environment/environmenta1.pdf.
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enforcement and compliance assistance programs. 170

Similarly, a 2004 GAO report noted significant "gaps" and
"duplication of effort" in water quality data. 171
The lack of data can inhibit sound policy formation at all
levels of government. In recent litigation over revisions to the
EPA's "New Source Review" regulations, the agency was forced
to acknowledge that its environmental impact analysis could not
"reasonably quantify" the impact of the proposed regulatory
changes on public health because the analysis was "based upon
GAO likewise concluded that the
incomplete data." 172
environmental impact of the mle was "uncertain because oflimited
data and difficulty in detennining how industrial companies will
respond to the mle." 173
A lack of quality environmental data also makes it difficult to
identify environmental baselines for the purpose of measuring
environmental progress or decline. In 2004 EPA announced the
classification under fish advisories of a record proportion of the
nation's rivers and streams due to contamination from mercury and
other toxic substances. 174 While there were only 20 fish advisories
in 1993, there were 175 by 2001, and 386 by 2003. 175 Yet the
increased number of advisories was not due to any measured
increase in water pollution or fish contamination; indeed,
emissions of mercury and other contaminants of concern have
declined substantially over the same time period that the number of
fish advisories skyrocketed. 176 Rather, the increased number of
170
171

!d. at 3.

U.S.
GEN.
ACCOUNTING
OFFICE,
GA0-04-382,
WATERSHED
MANAGEMENT: BETTER COORDINATION OF DATA COLLECTION EFFORTS
NEEDED TO
SUPPORT
KEY
DECISIONS
6
(2004),
available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04382.pdf.
172
New York v. EPA, 413 F.3d 3, 30 (D.C. Cir. 2005). It is possible that it
would be exceedingly difficult to quantifY these effects even if there were more
comprehensive data collection because much is dependent upon predictions
about industry behavior under a different set of regulatory requirements.
173
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GA0-03-947, CLEAN AIR ACT: EPA
SHOULD USE AVAILABLE DATA TO MONITOR THE EFFECTS OF ITS REVISIONS TO
THE NEW
SOURCE REVIEW PROGRAM
24 (2003),
available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03947.pdf.
174
See U.S. EPA, EPA-823-F-04-016, FACT SHEET: NATIONAL LISTING OF
FISH
ADVISORIES
(2004),
available at http://www.epa.gov/ost/fish/
advisories/factsheet.pdf.
175
Jd. at 3 tb1.3.
176
Jd. at I (noting that U.S. mercury emissions have declined by 50 percent

2005]

MISMATCH IN ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM

169

fish advisories was du~ to in part to an increase in water quality
testing conducted by environmental agencies. 177 In other words,
more rivers and streams were under fish advisories than ever
before because more river miles were tested than ever before.
While the federal government invests substantial resources in
environmental protection, and enforces a wide array of
environmental regulations, these efforts are not focused on those
areas in which the case for federal involvement is the strongest.
Just as the federal government has failed to address interstate
pollution spillovers, it has failed to concentrate federal resources in
those areas where federal efforts are most warranted due to
economies of scale. This mismatch undermines the effectiveness
of federal environmental protection.
IV. STATE-LEVEL CONSEQUENCES

The jurisdictional mismatch in environmental policy distorts
state environmental policymaking and can have significant
environmental consequences. As a result of extensive federal
involvement in areas best left in state or local hands, state policy
The lack of a match
development is heavily distorted. 178
between the scope of environmental problems and the political
jurisdictions asserting authority over such concerns leads to poor
prioritization. The over-centralization of environmental policy
further compounds the problem of excessive rigidity created by
excessive uniformity. 179 The extension of federal authority into
areas more properly left under state and local control does
not extinguish the demand for greater environmental protection at
the state and local level. It does, however, rechannel it. One
consequence of the mismatch is that state and local policy makers
increasingly tum to environmental issues and concerns where the
case for federal dominance is stronger.
The most obvious way federal action influences state
environmental protection efforts is when federal rules preempt
conflicting or varying state rules. For example, section 209(b) of
since 1990).
177
!d. at 2. Another contributing factor was the increased use of statewide
advisories in response to state testing results. !d.
178
The full range of federal regulation's potential effects on state regulatory
activity is surveyed in Adler, supra note 81.
179
See, e.g., BUTLER & MACEY, supra note 2, at 1 (noting that excessive
centralization produces "inflexibility and inertia").
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the Clean Air Act prohibits states from adopting "any standard
relating to the control of emissions from new motor vehicles." 180
Similarly, the Energy Policy Conservation Act preempts any state
regulation of automotive fuel economy .181 Preemption can be
express, as in the above examples, or implied. 182 Where implied
preemption is found, federal regulation will typically preclude any
state or local regulation whatsoever. 183
Because preemption operates to prevent state regulatory
activity, the net effect of federal preemption is for there to be less
regulation than there would have been otherwise. 184 Where federal
measures are insufficiently protective, or where federally imposed
uniformity is inefficient, there will be suboptimal results. As a
recent environmental group report concluded, " [f] ederal
preemption of states' ability to go above and beyond the federal
floor suppresses states' creativity in developing new approaches to
solving public policy problems, such as air pollution." 185
Sometimes federal preemption may be justified by economies of
scale. In other cases, however, preemption precludes the adoption
of state-level standards that are more tailored to local or regional
conditions and needs.
As a practical matter, a federal regulatory "floor" can become
a ceiling. The existence of a federal standard may discourage state
180
42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (2000). There are exceptions to this rule. The EPA
may waive preemption of emission standards adopted by California, subject to
certain conditions. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b) (2000). Where the EPA has approved a
waiver for California, other states may adopt the California rule. In all cases,
however, the other 49 states may not adopt a "third" standard. The Clean Air
Act contains similar provisions governing standards for gasoline. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2ll(c)(4).
181
49 U.S.C. § 32919(a) (2000). Unlike emission standards, there is no
conditional exemption for California.
182
See, e.g., Gade v. Nat'! Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992)
(state regulation is preempted "where the scheme of federal regulation is so
pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the
States to supplement it") (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218,
230 (1947)).
183
See Paul S. Weiland, Federal and State Preemption of Environmental
Law: A Critical Analysis, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 237, 258-59 (2000).
184
In some cases the purpose of federal preemption is to replace one type of
regulation with another, though this results in less regulation than if the federal
regulation was adopted in addition to the state regulation.
185
U.S. PIRG EDUC. FUND, POWER TO PROTECT: THE CRITICAL ROLE STATES
PLAY IN CLEANING UP POLLUTION FROM MOBILE SOURCES 34 (2005), available
at http://uspirg.org/reports/powertoprotect.pdf.
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policyrnakers from adopting and maintaining more stringent
measures of their own, even where such measures could be
justified. Many states have adopted legislation to prevent state
environmental agencies from adopting regulatory standards that
are more protective than federal rules. 186 New Mexico and
Colorado, for example, have statutes prohibiting the promulgation
of air pollution controls more stringent than what would be
required by federal law. 187 Virginia law bars state regulatory
authorities from requiring greater amounts of water treatment than
mandated under the federal Clean Water Act. 188 Others states have
general prohibitions against agency promulgation of environmental
rules more stringent than federal law. 189 Insofar as federal
standards are not based upon accurate, up-to-date scientific
assessments of environmental problems, and such information
about the nature and extent of environmental problems is not
available to state and local policymakers, the federal regulation
may have an even greater distorting effect on state priorities.
The mere existence of a federally mandated,_ floor also
preempts contrary state policies and environmental priorities. If a
local community has different health and environment-related
regulatory priorities, it still must meet the requirements of federal
law. 190 In 2000, for example, the outgoing Clinton Administration
proposed lowering the federal standard for arsenic in drinking
186

See Jerome M. Organ, Limitations on State Agency Authority to Adopt
Environmental Standards More Stringent than Federal Standards: Policy
Considerations and Interpretive Problems, 54 MD. L. REv. 1373, 1376-86
(1995); see also Arnold W. Rietze, Jr., Federalism and the Inspection and
Maintenance Program under the Clean Air Act, 27 PAC. L.J. 1461, 1465 (1996)
(noting "movement among state legislature to prohibit more stringent
This phenomenon continues today.
See James M.
state standards").
Taylor, Indiana Bill Would Ban State Agencies from Tightening
EPA Standards, ENV'T & CLIMATE NEWS, June 1, 2005, available at
http://www.heartland.org/Article.cfm?artid=17173.
187
See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 74-2-5 (LexisNexis 2000); CoLO. REV. STAT.
§ 25-7-114.2 (2004).
188
SeeVACODEANN. § 62.1-44.15:1 (2001).
189
See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12A.l20(1·)(A) (LexjsNexis 2003)
(prohibiting all administrative regulations "more stringent than the federal law or
regulations").
190
See, e.g., Keith Schneider, How a Rebellion over Environmental Rules
Grew from a Patch of Weeds, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1993, at A16 (quoting a
Columbus, Ohio health official as complaining that "the new rules coming out of
Washington are taking money from decent programs and making me waste tlfem
·
on less important problems").
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water from 50 to 10 parts per billion (ppb ), largely to reduce the
risk of bladder cancer from arsenic consumption. 191 While the
leaders of national environmental groups cheered the proposed
reduction in the federal arsenic standard, many communities faced
with high compliance costs were less enthusiastic. 192 In Los
Lunas, New Mexico groundwater naturally contains 12-19 ppb of
arsenic. Local officials estimated that reducing arsenic levels to
the new 10 ppb standard would cost $14 million. 193 Local experts
also noted that while New Mexico has among the highest natural
concentrations of arsenic in groundwater in the country, it also has
among the lowest rates of bladder cancer, leading many to
question whether spending millions to reduce local arsenic levels
was the most cost-effective way to safeguard public health. 194
There is even evidence that the federal arsenic rule will increase
risks to public health in some communities insofar as the higher
water rates necessary to pay for the change induces some families
to opt for water from their own wells. 195 Yet insofar as residents
of Los Lunas, or any other community, wish to adopt different
drinking water standards that are more in line with their
environmental and public health needs, and lack the resources to
pursue every laudable public health or environmental goal, the
federal standard precludes them from acting on their preferences.
While the federal government may preempt state regulatory
action, and may require state compliance with a general regulatory
scheme that does not target states-as-states, it cannot force states to
adopt federally desired regulations. It can, however, offer various
inducements to encourage state "cooperation." The federal
government may, for instance, condition funding on state
cooperation or threaten to preempt state and local regulations if
such measures do not meet federal requirements. This approach is
191

See National Primary Drinking Water Regulations; Arsenic and
Clarifications to Compliance and New Source Contaminants Monitoring, 66 Fed.
Reg. 6976, 6980-81 (Jan. 22, 2001).
192
One state, Nebraska, even sued the U.S. EPA to overturn the standard after
it was finally adopted by the Bush Administration. See Nebraska v. EPA, 331
F.3d 995 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
193
SCHOENBROD, supra note 13, at 171.
194
!d.; see also id. at 178 ("[A]ccording to Betty Behrend, Los Lunas's
utilities and public works director, 'The community need[ ed] other things worse
[than lowered arsenic levels]'.").
195
!d. at 178; see also Floyd Frost, Poisonous Decision: A Low Arsenic
Standard Carries a High Cost, WASH. POST, Sept. 16,2001, at B5.
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~typically referred to as "cooperative federalism," 196 though many

analysts question whether the relationship can be properly
described as "cooperative." 197 Particularly where the consequence
of state refusal to cooperate is the imposition of a federal
regulatory scheme, the "cooperative federalism" model does not
leave much flexibility in the scope and design of regulatory
programs.
Even where federal involvement is supposed to be
"cooperative," states are often precluded or at least discouraged
from adopting environmental policies that would be more efficient
or effective at addressing their particular environmental concerns
and demands. Under the Clean Air Act, for example, the federal
government uses the . threat of sanctions to impose federal air
pollution control priorities on state governments. Bpecifically, the
threatened loss of highway flli1ds induces states to adopt that mix
of air pollution control measures preferred by federal
policymakers, even when an alternative mix of pollution control
measures may produce greater environmental results.
The
adoption of one air pollution control measure may increase other
forms of pollution or otherwise contribute to other environmental
196

''[W]here Congress has the authority to regulate private activity under the
Commerce Clause, we have recognized Congress' power to offer States the
choice of regulating that activity according to federal standards or having state
law pre-empted by federal regulation.
This arrangement ... has been
termed ... cooperative federalism." New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144,
167 (1992) (citations and quotations omitted).
197
See, e.g., Dwyer, supra note 22, at 1185 ("So much political power has
been reallocated to the federal government that, at times, the states could be
mistaken for vassals of the federal government."); Robert V. Percival,
Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and Contemporary Models, 54 MD.
L. REv. 1144 (1995) ("[F]ederal environmental standards have been a chronic
source of friction for federal-state relations."). States are frequent litigants
challenging the validity or implementation of federal environmental regulations.
See, e.g., West Virginia v. EPA, 362 F.3d 861 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (challenging
federal regulations requiring nitrogen oxide emission reductions under state
implementation plans); Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663, (D.C. Cir. 2000)
(challenging federal regulations requiring nitrogen oxide emission reductions
under state implementation plans); Virginia v. EPA, 116 F.3d 499 (D.C. Cir.
1997) (challenging federal vehicle emission standards). For more on cooperative
federalism in environmental policy, see Jonathan H. Adler, Comment, The Green
Aspects of Printz: The Revival of Federalism and Its Implications for
Environmental Law, 6 GEO. MASON L. REv. 573, 575-82, 616-25 (1998). See
also DENISE SCHEBERLE, FEDERALISM AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: TRUST AND
THE POLITICS OF IMPLEMENTATION {1997); Robert L. Fischman, Cooperative
Federalism and Natural Resources Law, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 179, 183-88
(2005).
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problems. 198 Although ostensibly designed to reduce automotive
emissions, there is substantial scientific evidence that oxygenated
fuels provide little environmental benefit, 199 and can even cause
environmental harm. 200 This is not the only instance in which the
Clean Air Act mandates may impede the achievement of optimal
levels of environmental protection. Because the formation of
tropospheric ozone ("smog") is in part dependent upon ratios of
ozone precursors in the ambient air, measures that reduce ozone
levels in some cities increase ozone levels elsewhere? 01 Some
198

As Justice Breyer, then Judge Breyer, observed, "one can find many
examples of regulators' ignoring one program's safety or environmental effects
on another" STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD
EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION 22 (1993). On this point, see Frank R Cross, The
Paradoxical Perils of the Precautionmy Prindple, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 3,
851 (1996) (chronicling potential negative public health and environmental
impacts from environmental regulation); Edward W. Warren & Gary E.
Merchant, "More Good Than Harm": A First Principle for Environmental
Agendes and Reviewing Courts, 20 ECOLOGY. L. Q. 379, 390 (1993) (same).
199
See, e.g., COMM. ON OZONE-FORMING POTENTIAL OF REFORMULATED
GASOLINE, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, OZONE FORMING POTENTIAL OF
REFORMULATED GASOLINE 7 (1999), available at http://www.nap.edu/
catalog/9461.htrnl ("[T]he use of commonly available oxygenates in RFG has
little impact on improving ozone air quality and has some disadvantages."); id. at
45 (noting there is "uncertainty" as to whether any of the documented
improvement in urban air quality is due to the use ofreformulated gasoline). At
times, EPA has sought to use the federal oxygenate requirement to benefit
ethanol producers and other agricultural interests improve at the expense of air
quality. See, e.g., Am. Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 52 F.3d 1113, 1119 (D.C. Cir.
1995).
200
See Davis v. EPA, 348 F.3d 772, 777 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that waiver of
federal oxygenate requirement would reduce emissions of nitrogen oxides);
Harold M. Haskew et al., Fuel Permeation from Automotive Systems 1
(Coordinating Research Council Project No. E-65, 2004), available at
http://www.arb.ca.gov/fuels/gasoline/permeation/090204finalrpt.pdf
(documenting increased auto-related emissions from the use of ethanol as an
oxygenate); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GA0-02-753T, ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION: MTBE CONTAMINATION FROM UNDERGROUND STORAGE TANKS 2
(2002) (reporting that a majority of states have found MTBE in groundwater).
See generally Jonathan H. Adler, Clean Fuels, Dirty Air, in ENVIRONMENTAL
POLITICS: PUBLIC COSTS, PRIVATE REWARDS, supra note 77, at 19 (characterizing
the "clean fuels" program as an ethanol subsidy with little regard for
environmental benefits).
201
See, e.g., COMM. ON TROPOSPHERJC OZONE FORMATION AND
MEASUREMENT, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, RETHINKING TI-lE OZONE PROBLEM
IN URBAN AND REGIONAL AIR POLLUTION 12 (1992), available at
http:/!books.nap.edu/books/03090463 I 9/htmi/index.html
("[N]Ox
[nitrogen
oxide] reductions can have either a beneficial or detrimental effect on ozone
concentrations, depending on the locations and emissions rates of VOC [volatile
organic compound] and NOx sources in a region.").
_
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earlier measures had similar effects. For instance, air pollution
control provisions adopted as part of the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1977 were tailored to advantage regional coal
producers at the expense of their competitors, and air quality
suffered as a result. 202
Federal inaction can alter state environmental policy priorities
just as much as federal action. In some cases, federal failure to
conduct scientific research leaves states without the scientific and
technical information necessary to set environmental priorities in
accordance with local preferences.
The failure of federal
policymakers to address new or emerging environmental concerns
has encouraged states to become more aggressive in their approach
to such problems. 203 New York State, for example, sought to
restrict the sale of sulfur-dioxide emission credits under the Clean
Air Act due to concerns that such sales could increase pollution
within the state. 204 Yet because the federal government is
disproportionately active in those areas where there is no strong
case for federal involvement, states may be disproportionately
active in those areas where federal action, and perhaps even
federal preemption, would be preferable.
Global climate change policy is a prime example of increasing
state activity where federal action would provide for a greater
jurisdictional match. In recent years, state governments have
become quite active on climate change, both for and against
greater action to control greenhouse gas emissions. 205 As of 2004,
202

See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL,
DIRTY AIR (1981) (describing the role ofregional coal producers in the adoption
of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977).
203
See TESKE, supra note 21, at 168 ("A number of states ... have tried to
move aggressively to deal with pollution problems, viewing federal
policymaking as increasingly in a condition of policy gridlock."); see also
William W. Buzbee, Contextual Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL.
L.J. 108, 111-12 (2005).
204
See Clean Air Markets Group v. Pataki, 194 F. Supp. 2d 147, 161-62
(N.D.N.Y. 2002) (striking down New York law on dormant commerce clause
grounds). For more background on this litigation, see generally Andrew D.
Thompson, Public Health, Environmental Protection, and the Dormant
Commerce Clause: Maintaining State Soyereignty in the Federalist Structure, 55
CASE W. REs. L. REv. 213 (2004).
205
See TESKE, supra note 21, at .17 (noting several states adopted
carbon dioxide standards, while others oppose ratification of the Kyoto
Protocol); see also BARRY G. RABE, GREENHOUSE AND STATEHOUSE: THE
EVOLVING · STATE ROLE IN CLIMATE CHANGE 1 (2002), available
at http://www.pewclimate.org/document.cfm?documentiD=295 (current state
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28 states had begun developing greenhouse gas emission
policies. 206 Some, such as New Jersey, Massachusetts, and New
Hampshire, adopted emission reduction targets. In July 2002,
California adopted legislation requi1ing the California Air
Resources Board to "develop and adopt regulations that achieve
the maximum feasible and cost-effective reduction of greenhouse
gas emissions from motor vehicles."207 The state has also
embarked on an ambitious plan to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions by 25 percent over the next fifteen years. 208 Others
states have adopted voluntary plans. New York and seven other
states, mostly in the Northeast, also filed suit directly against
various Midwestern utilities alleging that their failure to control
greenhouse gas emissions constitutes common law nuisance. 209
This activity is the result, in pari, of relative federal inaction on
climate change. 210 Setting aside the question of whether regulatory
action to control greenhouse gases is worthwhile, it should be clear
that any such action is best undertaken at the national (if not
international) level, rather than by state and local governments.

policies indicate that a "bottom-up approach to addressing global climate
change" is inevitable for "a nation as physically large and economically diverse
as the United States"); Ann E. Carlson, Federalism, Preemption, and
Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 281,282 (2003) (noting that
many states "have quietly begun to fill the void in leadership that some believe
exists at the national level").
206
PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE ACTIVlTIES
IN
THE UNITED STATES: 2004 UPDATE 9 (2004), available at
http://www.pewclimate.org/document.cfm?documentlD=295.
207
A.B. 1493, codified in CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE§ 43018.5(a) (West
2005).
208
Juliet Eilprin, Cal!fornia Plan Aims to Slash Emissions, WASH. POST, Jun.
2, 2005, at A4.
209
See Miguel Bustillo, States to Sue Over Global Warming, L.A. TIMES, Jul.
21, 2004, at B8; see also Andrew C. Revkin, New York City and 8 States Plan to
Sue Power Plants, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 21, 2004, at Al5. In September 2005, a
federal district court dismissed the lawsuit on the grounds that it presented a
nonjusticiable political question. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc.,
2005 WL 2347900 (S.D.N.Y., Sep. 22, 2005).
210
See, e.g., Harry Stoffer, Fuel Economy Battle: Lack of Action on National
Level Forcing Groups to Push Regulations on State Level, TIRE BUSINESS, May
23, 2005, at 6 (noting Sierra Club efforts to push climate policies at the state
level); Buzbee, supra note 203, at 112.

2005]

MISMATCH IN ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM

177

CONCLUSION

Environmental protections would be more successful if
responsibility were divided between the federal and state
governments in a more justifiable manner. 211 Ideally, the federal
government should reorient its efforts toward those areas in which
the federal government possesses an institutional advantage, due to
economies of scale, or where state and local governments are
incapable of addressing environmental problems, such as where
there are substantial interstate spillovers. A greater "match"
between the scope of environmental problems and the institutions
entrusted with addressing such concerns would enhance the
efficiency, effectiveness, and equity of existing environmental
protection efforts.
The jurisdictional mismatch in environmental policy was not
created overnight, nor can it be cured easily. 212 Numerous reports
and studies have identified the deficiency in federal research and
scientific knowledge relevant to environmental concerns, and there
is some evidence of progress on this front. Addressing the
jurisdictional mismatch will be more difficult; at present there is
little interest in revisiting the basic structure of federal
environmental law in the legislative or executive branch. Nor are
courts likely to force wholesale revisions in existing federal
environmental regulations. 213
One possible means of addressing the jurisdictional mismatch
would be to create greater opportunities for states to free
themselves of inappropriate federal requirements. Elsewhere this
author has proposed a policy of "ecological forbearance," under
which states could petition federal agencies for waivers from
federal requirements where no compelling reasons exist to enforce
the federal rule. 214 Such a policy would enable states to
experiment with alternative means of environmental protection,
211
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212
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which could reopen the laboratories of democracy in
enviromnental policy. It also would have the potential to free up
federal resources to focus on those areas m which interstate
spillovers or economies of scale reqmre greater federal
involvement.
However it is accomplished, fixing the current jurisdictional
mismatch should be a high priority for environmental reform.
Despite the environmental successes of the past three decades, the
overlapping and contradictory state and federal rules do not lead to
efficient or effective environmental protection. It is in some
senses an historical accident that state leadership in environmental
policy was supplanted by federal regulation, and environmental
policy could be improved if states regained more of their historic
role.
The federal government did not come to dominate
environmental policy because a more decentralized system was
leading to environmental ruin. 215 Yet environmental protection
could be improved if federal dominance was confined to those
areas in which the federal government has something unique to
contribute.
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